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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Public Expenditure and the Institutional Set-
ting of the Public Sector
What is the role of the public sector? According to Richard Musgrave (1959), it
includes macroeconomic stabilization, income redistribution, and resource allocation.
To realize these objectives, the state levies taxes and provides goods and services for
individuals and firms. Oates (1972) already observed that institutional factors such
as the federal structure of a state play a huge role in this context. E.g. if the federal
government, a supranational organization (for instance the EU), or a strong private
sector try to influence the decision process at the regional level, this may well determine
the amount and quality of the goods and services provided. Thus, the distribution of
decision power among different political institutions or the size of the public sector
itself is likely to affect the composition of public expenditure. Until now, these links
are still not completely understood. It is the aim of this thesis to cast some more
light on the impact of the institutional setup of the public sector on its expenditure
decisions.
Two institutional features are of particular interest to us: fiscal federalism and pri-
vatization. First, it is well known that the distribution of power among different
1
tiers of government, that is fiscal federalism, may affect the spending decisions of the
government. While there exists a huge literature on fiscal federalism with two tiers
of government, the implications of more complex federal structures for the level and
composition of public spending is still an open issue. For instance, the EU can be in-
terpreted as a governmental structure with at least three tiers of government: regional
and national governments as well as the EU itself. In this case it is no longer clear,
how the different tiers of governments will behave and which level of public investment
is actually realized. One important aspect here is that the federal structure does not
only affect the level, but also the composition of public spending and investment. Sec-
ond, privatization is another important institutional aspect, which might affect public
spending: If a public firm is privatized, it is likely to change from a mostly social to-
wards a more profit oriented objective. This may lead to changes in the demand for
public services and goods and thereby the spending decisions of the government.
This thesis is organized as follows: The remainder of this chapter discusses the basic
findings of the thesis and its policy implications in a broader context. Chapter 2 in-
vestigates how redistribution in more complex federal systems affects regional public
investment. Chapter 3 provides an empirical analysis of what determines the com-
position of public investment in Europe, with fiscal decentralization being of special
interest. Finally, Chapter 4, provides a theoretical framework to better understand
how privatization may affect public spending and in particular redistribution. Note
that all four Chapters can be read independently.
1.2 Fiscal Federalism and Public Expenditure
There is a huge literature on the determinants and implications of fiscal federalism.
One of its basic questions is how to distribute spending and tax autonomy between
the regional and the central governments. Oates (1972) developed a comprehensive
framework to analyze the potential advantages and drawbacks of a centralized sys-
tem. On the one hand, decentralization assures that decisions are made as close as
possible to where people actually live. This facilitates the adjustment of the provision
2
of public goods to the heterogeneous preferences of voters. This is what the famous
”Decentralization Theorem” dating back to Oates (1972) basically says. On the other
hand, externalities of different kinds may affect public expenditure (see e.g. Keen and
Marchand (1998)). E.g. regions may compete in tax rates to attract firms or in pub-
lic goods to attract human capital. In this case, inefficiencies arise due to strategic
behavior of regional governments. A strong central government is then needed to set
the proper incentives in order to implement the optimal provision of public goods at
the local level. In practical terms both issues - response to local preference as well as
externalities - are relevant. Most countries therefore opt for kind of a ”in-between”
solution - that is a federal system where decisions are taken partly by local and partly
by federal institutions. However, the degree of fiscal federalism may also affect the
level and composition of public spending and in particular of public investment as we
will see below.
In Chapter 2, we try to understand the incentive effects generated by (de-)centralization
in more complex federal systems. Indeed, federal systems are often more sophisticated
than commonly assumed: In many cases, at least three tiers of government are involved
in federal decision making. For instance in Germany or the US, there exist central,
state, and local governments, implying a rather complex structure of the federal sys-
tem in place. The EU itself is also organized beyond at least three tiers of government,
though the EU as the highest tier disposes of only limited autonomy. This chapter is
to better understand how the distribution of power among higher tiers of governments
affects the investment decisions taken at the regional level. Based on Dahlby (1996),
we set up a model with three tiers of government, to analyze federal redistribution in
the presence of fiscal externalities. Our analysis identifies an additional qualitative dis-
incentive effect, particularly for intermediate governments: They behave strategically
in order to attract additional redistribution funds from outside, while still employing
corrective policies towards their own regions. Our results also suggest that differently
from the US, the federal system of the EU may lead to inefficiently low regional in-
vestment. This holds, because by construction the EU does not dispose over sufficient
autonomy to thwart regional and national under-investment tendencies.
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Chapter 3 provides an empirical investigation of the impact of decentralization not only
on the level, but also on the composition of public investment. Though, public invest-
ment is an important variable in economics, its nature, drivers, and impact are still not
completely understood. Most notably, there is often confusion about what it is in the
first place. Perhaps the most prominent example of this type of confusion is the custom-
ary synonymous use of ”public investment” and ”infrastructure investment” in much
of economic literature. Our data show, however, that there is a great deal of infrastruc-
ture investment that is not public, and there is a great deal of public investment that is
not infrastructure investment. While it is well-known that many roads and municipal
swimming pools are publicly funded and provided, both economic theory and empiri-
cal analyses have hardly distinguished between them. Keen and Marchand (1997) are
among the first to think about what affects the composition of public spending. Based
on their theoretical findings, we concentrate on public investment, only. The anal-
ysis yields some interesting insights, most notably that fiscal decentralization boosts
economically productive public investment, notably infrastructure, while economically
less productive public investment, such as recreational facilities, remains unchanged.
While not readily reconcilable with the traditional theory of fiscal federalism, these
findings can be interpreted in terms of the literature on fiscal competition, with not
only tax rates but also the quality of public expenditure (in particular infrastructure)
weighing in firms’ location decisions.
1.3 Privatization and Public Expenditure
Since privatization - by definition - affects the structure of the public sector it will most
likely also have an impact on its spending decisions. First of all, privatization shifts the
objective of firms from welfare maximization towards more profit orientation. Persons
employed in a public firm may then be exposed to a lower risk of becoming unemployed
than private employees. Until now, however, little is known about how privatization
affects other sectors of government activity (Sheshinski et al. (2003)), in particular as
regards the level and composition of public expenditure. For instance, a change in the
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demand for public goods may lead to an increase of public funds (higher taxation) or
an adjustment of the composition of public spending, (e.g. public investment vs. social
spending). Thus, in order to properly assess the benefits of privatization, it is essential
to understand its implications for public expenditure.
Chapter 4 provides a framework to investigate how privatization might affect public
social spending. Based on Kanbur (1981), the model includes two sectors, a private
and a public, with the risk of becoming unemployed being higher in the private sector.
An exogenously given increase of privatization then leads to a higher expected rate of
unemployment as well as higher productivity of workers. Since it is the privatization
policy of the government that generates additional risks, it is likely that voters will
require it to bear the cost involved. The public sector will increase its social spending
in order to satisfy the changing demand for public goods. We investigate how privati-
zation affects the per capita unemployment transfers as well as overall redistribution
if transfers are financed only through the profits of the public firms or through public
profits and a lump-sum tax. Our results suggest that overall redistribution increase
with privatization under rather mild assumptions, while per capita transfers decrease if
redistribution is financed only through profits of public firms. On the other hand, if the
government disposes over lump-sum taxes as additional tool to finance redistribution,
both overall and per capita redistribution increase with privatization. Moreover, if it
is costly to raise tax funds, it is no longer clear whether privatization leads to overall
efficiency gains: Higher redistribution is accompanied by a higher need to raise costly
tax funds, which outbalances at least some of the benefits from privatization.
1.4 Policy Implications
Public spending is an important driver of the overall economic performance. As our
results suggest, there is a link between institutional characteristics - with our main
focus being on decentralization and privatization - and the level and composition of
public expenditure. This allows for interesting policy conclusions:
First, supra-national or federal cooperation may not only lead to efficiency gains, but
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also generate additional disincentive effects at different levels of government. As Chap-
ter 2 suggests, political decision processes in more complex federal systems cause ad-
ditional strategic behavior of political representatives. This is particularly true for
intermediate levels of government, which then try to exploit the central (or supra-
national) government in order to benefit their own jurisdictions. One should therefore
bear in mind that supranational cooperation leads to a higher complexity and addi-
tional distortions within the system, which stand against its benefits (e.g. efficiency
gains from free trade).
Second, in more complex federal structures, it is important to transfer sufficient au-
tonomy towards the highest tier of government. Our findings have wide-ranging im-
plications, especially for the European Union: If too little power is delegated to the
highest tier of government, there is no way to evade the additional disincentive effects
arising through the more complex federal structure. Thus, the additional externality
in our setting requires more centralization. As the example of the EU shows, especially
in transition or reform periods, this may be difficult to achieve. One possible solution
to the problem is to delegate tax autonomy towards the EU to finance the required
investment grants for the regions.
Third, institutional reforms - in particular decentralization - affect not only the level,
but also the composition of public investment. This has wide-ranging implications for
the economic performance and the provision of public goods at the local level. We find
that decentralization leads to externalities, which distort the composition of public
investment towards more infrastructure. Thus, against the common intuition, central
governments should pay attention that their regions do not over-invest in order to
attract private firms. This is an interesting result, in particular since most governments
run comprehensive grant programs to boost regional investment.
Fourth, privatization is another important factor to understand the composition of
public spending and the role of the state in general. While privatization implies less
state intervention in one respect (less influence in firm’s decisions) it entails higher
government activity in other respects (more redistribution). This shift in government
engagement generates additional indirect distortions: On the one hand, the additional
6
need for public funds to finance redistribution may generate a social cost - e.g. through
the excess burden of taxation. On the other hand, higher social spending may also be
financed through a reduction in other types of public spending (e.g. public investment).
In both cases, additional distortions arise, which at least partly outbalance the benefits
of privatization. Thus, in order to correctly assess the benefits of a privatization reform,
it is crucial to understand its potential indirect effects on the tax and expenditure
policies of the government.
Note that one should be careful in deriving specific policy recommendations from these
conclusions. Both theoretical and empirical findings are based on assumptions, which
may not hold under real conditions. For instance, the three tiered federal structure in
Chapter 1 assumes a benevolent government and complete information - assumptions
which may not hold in real political decision processes. Furthermore, the empirical
analysis in Chapter 3 by construction does not distinguish between the spending de-
cisions made by different tiers of government. Thus, it is not straightforward to see,
which implications these results have for a specific regional or federal government.
Additional research would be highly valuable in this context.
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Chapter 2
Fiscal Externalities in a Three-Tier
Structure of Government
2.1 Introduction
In contrast to the common assumption in the literature on fiscal federalism, more than
two tiers of government are involved in most federal decision-making. E.g. regions
in the US finance expenditure by about 20 percent through federal transfers and by
35 percent through state grants. On the other hand, local governments in the EU
receive more than 70 percent of their grants from national governments, while the EU
itself only plays a minor role in the provision of regional funds.1 This implies that the
role of the intermediate government is much stronger in Europe than in the US. We
argue that such differences in the allocation of power between the two highest tiers
of government crucially determine the behavior at each level of government. In this
context, the role of the middle-level governments is of particular interest: They employ
corrective policies vis-a-vis their regions, while still engaging in strategic interaction
with the highest level of government.
In order to understand the complexity of such federal systems, we focus on federal re-
1Portugal is one important exception. Its regions receive about 19 percent of grants from interna-
tional organizations. See Ford (1999) and Bergvall (2006) for further details.
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distribution with fiscal externalities of public investment. Regional redistribution may
generate a need for additional investment grants. This argument holds if federal redis-
tribution exerts fiscal externalities leading to strategic behavior and under-investment
by all regions (e.g. see Dahlby (1996)). However, with three tiers of government, not
only the level of federal redistribution matters, but also the allocation of redistribution
power between the two highest levels of government. This becomes particularly evi-
dent within the EU. There, middle-level and high-level authorities may have different
objectives for federal redistribution and the use of corrective matching grants. Further,
differently from the US, the highest level of government in the EU does not dispose
over tax autonomy. For this reason it provides conditional transfers for investment
only towards poor regions as shown in Figure (2.1). Thereby, the EU wants to achieve
two aims at the same time: On the one hand, it redistributes from rich to poor regions.
On the other hand, it still aims at implementing optimal regional investment. All this
suggests that the analysis of fiscal externalities in more complex federal structures can
be expected to become increasingly important in the future.
Figure 2.1: EU Structural Funds 2004-2006, Areas Eligible under Objective 1 and 2
Objective 1
Phasing out 05
Phasing out 06
Special Program
Objective 2
Objective 2 (partly)
Phasing out 05
Phasing out 06
Source: European Union (2006).
This paper investigates federal redistribution with three tiers of governments when
regional investment generates fiscal externalities. Within this setting we try to under-
9
stand the impact of fiscal externalities on investment targets and corrective policies
at different tiers of government. Our findings suggest that a transfer of redistribution
power towards the highest level of government generates an additional, qualitative in-
centive effect for middle level governments: They want their own regions to under-invest
in order to attract additional redistribution funds from outside regions.
Within this setting, we also analyze the role of tax autonomy to finance corrective
policies at the two highest levels of government. Three cases are distinguished: First,
both high level and middle level governments finance corrective matching grants with
region type specific taxation. This tax schedule allows concentrating on the pure
disincentive effects arising from redistribution. Since the middle level government wants
its regions to strategically under-invest in order to attract additional redistribution
funds, only the highest level of government provides conditional transfers. Second, we
assume a general lump sum tax to finance corrective matching grants. In this case,
the tax regime generates an additional, indirect redistribution effect. Thus, middle
level governments balance the positive effect from taxation with the negative effect of
redistribution resulting in a higher investment target. In this case, both high level
and middle level governments provide conditional transfers to implement first best
investment at the regional level. Third, corresponding to the federal structure of the
EU, we assume that only middle level governments dispose over tax autonomy to
finance matching grants. In this case, the high level government can provide investment
incentives to its regions only if it imposes investment restrictions on its equalization
transfers. Thus, if redistribution funds available at the EU-level are low, this may lead
to inefficiently low investment by both rich and poor regions.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 gives a short literature overview. Section
2.3 presents the basic model with two tiers of government. Section 2.4 extends this
setting to a three-tiered federal system with mutual redistribution by the two highest
levels of governments. After characterizing the impact of mutual redistribution on the
investment targets at all three tiers of government, Section 2.4.1 determines matching
grant policies adopted by the two higher levels of governments with type specific taxa-
tion. This setting is generalized in Section 2.4.2 where we allow for general lump sum
10
taxes to finance matching transfers. Section 2.4.3 investigates the case where only the
middle-level government can levy taxes. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
The analysis of intergovernmental grants and federal redistribution is well established
in economic theory. A good overview is provided by Johnson (1988) proposing a general
theory of redistribution. He also refers to problems arising from spillovers and factor
mobility. However, he does not explicitly address strategic disincentives generated
within the redistribution system itself. More recently, Persson and Tabellini (1996)
present a general framework of redistribution and taxation. Oates (1972) provided an
analytical framework justifying conditional grants. He proved optimality of matching
grants to account for spillover effects of public goods beyond regional borders.
More than one decade later, Inman (1988) doubted whether the widespread use of con-
ditional grants can only be justified by traditional efficiency and spillover arguments.
His findings motivated further research to explain conditional grants as a common pol-
icy instrument, for instance, by introducing information asymmetries, fiscal externali-
ties, and conditional grants in redistribution systems. E.g. Huber and Runkel (2006)
assume information asymmetries among national and regional governments to show
that conditional block grants or capped matching grants may be required to imple-
ment a second best solution. As Dahlby (1996) shows, federal redistribution generates
fiscal externalities leading to under-investment by all regions. Regional governments
account for the positive income effect of their investment resulting in less federal trans-
fers in the future. This argument is empirically supported by the study of Matheson
(2005). He finds that federal redistribution does discourage regional investment in
Russia. Also, Fenge and Wrede (2004) pointed out that redistribution within the EU
generates externalities. However, they do not refer to the impact of more sophisticated
three-tiered federal systems on the implemented level of regional investment and opti-
mal matching grants by both national and EU bodies. Martinez-Lopez (2005) argues
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that fiscal externalities may results in either under- or over-investment in a setting with
two tiers of government by considering additional tax externalities. Since the empirical
impact of this finding needs still to be explored, we abstract from his analysis and
concentrate on the disincentive effects generated by fiscal externalities.
Although three-tiered federal structures are rather common, only few papers are con-
cerned with this issue. E.g. see Cremer and Pestieau (1996) for a literature review
on the distributive implications of European integration. However, in most cases this
literature cuts the perspective of regional behavior and thereby falls back on an anal-
ysis with two tiers of government, only. One exception is Cremer and Pestieau (1997)
considering income redistribution in a setting with three tiers of government. They
identify a trade off between inter- and intra-national redistribution under incomplete
information. Differently from their approach, we concentrate on fiscal externalities of
redistribution and corrective policies in a setting with three tiers of government and
complete information. This allows identifying the structural disincentive effects arising
in more complex federal systems.
In a broader sense this paper is also related to the bailout problem prominently ex-
amined by Wildasin (1997). He also highlights strategic behavior of regions as means
to acquire additional federal aid. However, compared to our analysis, Wildasin in-
vestigates a rather extreme case concerning strategic jurisdictional bankruptcy. In
the present setting, conditional grant payments may be interpreted as instruments to
prevent future bailout.
2.3 Benchmark Case: Two Tiers of Government
As a benchmark, we investigate the disincentives for regional investment generated
within a redistribution system with two tiers of government. For this purpose consider
a federation consisting of one central government and a large number (N) of regions of
type 1 and of type 2, respectively. Production in region i is logarithmic and depends
12
on the type specific productivity parameter ρi as well as public investment Ii:
Yi = ρi · lnIi (2.1)
The analysis is undertaken from the perspective of a particular region of type 1, but
results directly apply to any other region. You may interpret I1 as a public input such
as infrastructure or schooling outlays.2 The representative individual in region 1 exclu-
sively enjoys utility from private consumption C1. In order to isolate the pure strategic
argument in this framework, local public investment is assumed to generate no direct
utility or spillover effects. Individuals only benefit from regional public investment
through increases in per capita income. The private budget constraint reads
C1 = Y1 + b ·
(∑2
k Yk
2
− Y1
)
− I1.
The redistribution parameter b  [0, 1] may be referred to as the rate of income equal-
ization among regions. For b = 0 no federal redistribution occurs, for b = 1 regional
income gaps are completely offset.
Regional governments maximize the utility of the representative consumer. Together
with the private budget constraint, the regional objective function writes
U(C1) = U
(
Y1 + b ·
(∑2
k Yk
2
− Y1
)
− I1
)
The central government maximizes utilitarian welfare over both types of regions.3
W =
2∑
i
U
(
Yi + b ·
(∑2
k Yk
2
− Yi
)
− Ii
)
(2.2)
2Note that usually transfers are determined on the basis of GDP in precedent years and investment
generates benefits only in the future. However, introducing dynamics into the model complicates the
analysis without providing further insights.
3Note that in this specification the central government wants to choose b such that marginal utilities
are equalized over regions. Since we are only interested in how different tiers of government react to
a redistribution system, we henceforth assume parameter b to be exogenously fixed. Indeed, in most
countries the degree of federal redistribution seems to be rather inflexible at least in the mid-term, as
federal structures are mostly established by complex political processes.
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Maximizing the objective functions of the central and regional government wrt. I1
shows that income equalization at rate b leads to under-investment of both rich and poor
regions. Their investment target
(
Ii = ρi · (1− b2)
)
is below the target of the central
planer (Ii = ρi). In line with Dahlby (1996), fiscal externalities of investment arise due
to federal redistribution. Taking the level of redistribution, b, as granted, each region
is aware of the positive income effect of its investment as well as its negative impact
on redistribution transfers received from other regions: For a rich region, additional
investment leads to higher transfers payable to poor regions. For a poor region, higher
investment results in fewer transfers received from rich regions. Both types of regions do
not account for the positive effects of their own investment on transfer commitments of
other regions. The central planer, however, accounts for all fiscal externalities. Thus,
its investment target exceeds the actual investment of both rich and poor regions.
Clearly, the regional incentives to under-invest can not be resolved without additional
intervention by the center.
Since redistribution generates incentives for regions to under-invest, the center has
to achieve two objectives at the same time. First, it has to assure an exogenously
given degree of redistribution among regions. Second, it wants to implement first
best investment by introducing corrective policies. In line with the standard literature
in public finance, corrective matching grants are an efficient instrument to provide
incentives for regional expenditure (e.g. see Oates (1972)). This reasoning imposes the
following sequence on the model:
1. The redistribution parameter, b, is exogenously determined.
2. The central government determines the matching rate γ1.
3. Regional governments invest I1(γ1, b).
If regional government 1 receives a conditional matching transfer from the central
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government, its budget-constraint is given by
C1 = Y1(I1) + b ·
(∑2
k Yk(·)
2
− Y1(·)
)
− (1− γ1) · I1 − T1.
γi is the matching rate of the center towards region i. Matching transfers are financed
by overall lump sum tax Ti, defined as
Ti =
∑2
k γk · Ik
2
.
This leads to
Proposition 2.1: Assume regional income equalization at rate b. Then,
i) matching rate γ1 = 1− 1−
b
2
(1− b
2
+
U′2
U′1
· b
2
)
implements first best investment by region 1.
ii) matching rates for rich regions are higher than for poor regions.
Proof see Appendix 2.6. .
We know that without further intervention by the central planer, regional governments
under-invest for a given level of redistribution, b. In order to correct for strategic
behavior, the central government provides additional matching grants for regional in-
vestment. If the center finances a share γ1 of investment, regions effectively face a
lower cost of investment and are therefore willing to invest more. This mechanism as-
sures overall efficiency: The center can meet the exogenously determined redistribution
target and at the same time assure first best investment by regional governments.
Note that the matching rate depends on relative marginal utilities. Regions of type 1
are poor relative to regions of type 2 for U ′1 > U
′
2. If the difference in income rises, the
center is willing to increase its investment target for the rich regions in order to partly
close this gap: More production in the rich regions leads to higher transfers to the poor
regions and thereby to a reduction in their marginal productivity. Thus, the center
increases its matching rate for the rich type in order to boost overall production in the
economy and redistribution towards the poor type. Note that for identical marginal
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utilities, the result simplifies to γ1 =
b
2
, which corresponds to the externality generated
by federal income equalization at share b with two types of regions involved.
2.4 Analysis with Three Tiers of Government
Disincentive structures and optimal corrective policies are much more complex in a
federal system with three tiers of government. E.g. consider the US or the EU: Two
tiers of government (federal and state vs. supranational and national governments)
with distinct objectives mutually redistribute and engage in corrective policies towards
their regions. However, there are crucial differences between the US- and EU-system. In
the US, federal and state governments dispose over tax autonomy to finance matching
transfers. In the EU, only national governments can levy taxes to finance conditional
grants. As we will see this may have far-reaching implications for the implemented
level of regional investment.
For the moment, the central government may either represent a federal or a suprana-
tional government. We label this the high-level or H-government. The state or national
governments in-between are called middle-level or M-governments. In particular, as-
sume two middle-level governments, A and B, both consisting of N regions of type 1
and 2 or of type 3 and 4, respectively, where N is assumed to be large. The high-
level maximizes over four representative regions, while each middle level government
maximizes over two types of regions. This structure is shown in Figure (2.2).
From the perspective of a regional government, redistribution transfers are determined
by two institutions at different hierarchical levels. The region is only concerned with
the utility of its representative voter. Parameter c represents the share of redistribution
exogenously assigned to the high-level government. Redistribution transfers for each
region are now provided by one middle-level as well as high-level government: A share
(b− c) of redistribution is accomplished by the middle-level government, while a share
c of redistribution is transferred from the middle-level government to the high-level
government: For example, if 10 percent of the regional income gap is to be covered by
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Figure 2.2: Redistribution with Three Tiers of Government
High Level 
Government
Middle Level
Government A 
Middle Level
Government B
N Regions of 
Type 4
N Regions of
Type 2
N Regions of 
Type 1
N Regions of 
Type 3
Redistribution share (b-c)
Redistribution share c
Redistribution share (b-c)
high-level redistribution, the middle-level government reduces its share of redistribution
by the same percentage. This assures that parameter c captures a qualitative shift in
redistribution power while leaving its absolute level unchanged. Note that for c = 0,
we fall back to the benchmark case discussed in Section 2.3.
In the following, preferences are supposed to be linear in consumption. This allows
disregarding discrepancies between marginal utilities.4 Adopting again the perspective
of a particular region of type 1, the regional objective function writes
U(C1) = Y1 + (b− c) ·
(∑2
k=1 Yk
2
− Y1
)
+ c ·
(∑4
k=1 Yk
4
− Y1
)
− I1 (2.3)
with b, c  [0, 1] assumed to be exogenously given and b ≥ c. We define Yi(·) = Yi(Ii) =
Yi. Transfers from the middle-level are identical to the redistribution grants of the
central planer in Section 3, since it also considers two types of regions, only. The
high-level government compares regional GDP with average GDP over all four types
of regions and equalizes income disparities by a share c.
The middle-level government A considers utilitarian welfare of representative regions
4With a nonlinear utility function, results remain qualitatively unchanged. However, differences in
marginal utilities among regions are then accounted for in form of weights, complicating calculations
notably.
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of type 1 and 2:
WMA =
2∑
i=1
(
Yi + (b− c) ·
(∑2
k=1 Yk
2
− Yi
)
+ c ·
(∑4
k=1 Yk
4
− Yi
)
− Ii
)
. (2.4)
Finally, the high-level government maximizes utility over all 4 types of regions:
WH =
4∑
i=1
(
Yi + (b− c) ·
(∑2
k=1 Yk
2
− Yi
)
+ c ·
(∑4
k=1 Yk
4
− Y1
)
− Ii
)
. (2.5)
Before going into the analysis of corrective policies by the two upper tiers of govern-
ment, let us identify the effect of a shift in redistribution power towards the highest
level (as measured by parameter c) on investment incentives of regional, middle-level,
and high-level governments. Note that regions can realize their own preferred level of
investment, as long as M- and H-governments do not dispose over matching transfers
as additional policy instrument. The investment target of the middle-level government
for region i is labeled IMi , the target for the high-level is labeled I
H
i . These targets
are determined by maximizing Equation (2.4) and Equation (2.5) with respect to Ii,
respectively. This leads to
Proposition 2.2: Assume that redistribution is implemented jointly by a M- and a
H-government. Then,
i) the investment incentive of a regional government of type 1 decreases in b.
ii) the regional investment target of the M-government decreases in c.
iii) the regional investment target of the H-government is independent of b and c.
iv) the regional investment target of the H-government exceeds the target of the M-
government. Thus, IH1 > I
M
1 > I
∗
1 .
Proof see Appendix 2.6. .
Quantitative disincentive effects from redistribution are captured by b. Thus, along
the argument in Section 2.3, fiscal externalities at the regional level increase in the
redistribution parameter b. For a higher value of b, regions can gain more by exploiting
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the federal redistribution system. On the other hand, the regional desire to invest is not
affected by a shift in redistribution power among high level and middle level government
as measured by parameter c. This result holds, since the number of regions of each
type is already large: A transfer of more redistribution autonomy to a higher level -
considering more regions - does not change the strategic considerations of a regional
government competing already with a large number of regions.5
A middle-level government only considers regions within its own borders. Due to
constant marginal utilities and the symmetry in our model, there is no quantitative
effect of redistribution (measured by b) at the middle-level. Redistribution among its
regions per se, does not generate disincentives, since the M-government does take into
account the fiscal externalities arising among its own regions. On the other hand, it
knows well that for any c > 0, a lower output in region 1 leads to more redistribution at
the central level and thereby potential resource inflows from outside regions. Thus, the
middle-level government accounts for the qualitative change in redistribution power by
behaving more strategically if parameter c increases. However, its investment target
will always exceed the regional target, since it already accounts for strategic behavior
among its own regions.
The high-level government maximizes utility over all regions in the federation. It
properly accounts for all existing fiscal externalities within the system. Therefore, its
investment objective is independent of b. For the same reason a qualitative change of
redistribution as measured by a change in parameter c, does not occur at the high level.
Its investment target is above the target of both middle level and regional governments
and identical to the result for the central planer in Section 2.3.
Without corrective policies, regional under-investment occurs, since H- and M gov-
ernments do not dispose over any means to affect regional behavior. Therefore, we
introduce matching grants from the high and the middle-level government towards
their regions. Three settings are of particular interest: Section 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 assume
5Note that for small values of N this result does not hold. High level redistribution then implies
redistribution over a larger number of (countable) regions resulting in an increase of strategic behavior
and thereby additional investment disincentives for each region.
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that conditional transfers are financed by region type specific or lump sum taxes, re-
spectively. The latter resembles the federal structure in the US. Section 2.4.3 refers to
a structure similar to the EU, where the highest level of government can not impose
taxes, but provides redistribution funds conditional on investment.
2.4.1 Non-Redistributive Funding of Matching Grants
In the following, we introduce conditional transfers, which are financed through region-
type specific taxes by both the high level and middle level. The high-level government
may here be interpreted as a federal government, whereas intermediate governments
correspond to state authorities. Consider b and c again to be exogenously determined
and a federal structure as described in Figure (2.2). Middle- as well as high-level
governments dispose over independent tax autonomy. The structure of the model
evolves as follows:
1. Redistribution parameters b and c are exogenously determined.
2. Simultaneous Move Game between M- and H-government in γMi and γ
H
i .
3. Regional governments invest Ii(γ
M
i , γ
H
i , b, c).
γMi and γ
H
i are region specific matching rates provided by the middle-level and high-
level government towards region i, respectively. Intuitively, we impose non-negativity
constraints γHi ≥ 0 and γMi ≥ 0. Referring again to a particular region of type 1,
Equation (2.3) rewrites
U1 = Y1 + (b− c)
(∑2
k=1 Yk
2
− Y1
)
+ c
(∑4
k=1 Yk
4
− Y1
)
− (1− γM1 − γH1 )I1 − T1
with T1 = T
M
1 +T
H
1 defined by N ·TM1 =
∑N
k γ
M
k · Ik and N ·TH1 =
∑N
k γ
H
k · Ik. In this
setting, matching grants are financed by type specific lump sum taxes. This kind of
funding does not generate additional investment distortions and isolates the impact of
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direct redistribution on investment targets and corrective policies.6 Note also that γMi
and γHi are strategic substitutes. The maximization problem of H- and M-governments
are set up accordingly by referring to Equation (2.4) and Equation (2.5). Since the
number of regions of each type is large, regions do not consider the tax effect in their
optimization problem. Solving this game backwards leads to
Proposition 2.3: Assume that redistribution is implemented jointly by a M- and a
H-government and matching transfers are financed by type specific taxation. Then, in
the unique Nash Equilibrium, γH1 > 0 and γ
M
1 = 0. The first best regional investment
target of H, IH1 , is implemented.
Proof see Appendix 2.6. .
Conditional grants are provided only by the high-level government, whose regional
investment objective exceeds the target of the middle-level. The H-government com-
pletely takes into account fiscal externalities and therefore aims at implementing first
best investment. On the other hand, the M-government intends to attract additional
redistribution funds from outside regions for c > 0 (see Proposition 2). Therefore, it
wants its regions to invest below first best. It provides a matching rate below the pre-
ferred level of the H-government. In response, the high-level increases its matching rate
in order to prevent investment below its own target. This leads to over-investment from
the perspective of the middle-level government, which in response reduces its matching
rate even further. Repeating this line of argument results in a corner solution: The
middle-level government does not provide any investment grants, since γM1 is bounded
from below by γM1  [0, 1]. The high-level government can implement its first best
target by choosing its matching rate γH1 > 0 high enough.
6Section 2.4.2 addresses additional incentives arising from a more plausible funding of matching
grants through general lump sum taxes.
21
2.4.2 Redistributive Funding of Matching Grants
In the following we analyze regional investment targets and corrective policies if the
funding of matching grants generates additional incentive effects. Again, assume that
c is exogenously determined and preferences are linear in consumption. As before,
regions do not consider the tax effect in their optimization problem, since the num-
ber of each type of regions is large. Middle as well as high-level governments dispose
over tax autonomy to finance conditional investment transfers. However, matching
grants are now funded by general lump sum taxes according to Ti = T
M + TH with
4 · N · TM = ∑4Nk γMk · Ik and 2 · N · TH = ∑2Nk γHk · Ik. In this sense, the general
tax system varies over levels of government. Compared to the high-level government,
a middle-level government includes fewer regions in the lump sum tax mechanism to
finance matching grants. As we will see, funding matching grants thereby generates an
additional, indirect redistribution effect. Solving the simultaneous move game back-
wards leads to
Proposition 2.4: Assume that federal redistribution is implemented jointly by a M-
and a H-government and matching grants are financed by general lump sum taxes.
Then, in the unique Nash Equilibrium, γH1 = c and γ
M
1 = b − c. Investment targets
of H- and M-governments are equal, IH1 = I
M
1 , and correspond to first best regional
investment.
Proof see Appendix 2.6. .
General lump sum taxes generate positive investment incentives at the middle-level.
The lump sum tax to finance matching grants varies over levels of government. Com-
pared to the high-level, the tax schedule of the middle-level government includes fewer
regions. This generates an additional, indirect redistribution effect: The M-government
takes into account that conditional transfers from the high-level towards its regions are
partly financed outside its own borders. In consequence, it is interested in attracting
additional matching transfers provided by the high-level. Though, the potential of ex-
ploiting the redistribution system through under-investment remains unchanged. After
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all, this leads to an increase in the investment target of the middle-level government
compared to the analysis in Section 2.4.1.
In the unique Nash Equilibrium, the H-government responds to the additional invest-
ment incentives at the middle-level by reducing its matching transfers. The high-level
accounts for the positive impact of its matching rate on the investment target of the
middle-level. It sets γH1 such that the target of the middle-level corresponds to the first
best. This occurs if the tax effect neutralizes the negative effect of federal redistribution
on the investment target of the M-government, which is achieved for γH1 = c. A match-
ing grant γH1 above this level is not optimal, since it leads to incentives to over-invest
for the M-government: Its willingness to exploit the tax system at the high level would
be stronger than the disincentives from redistribution. A matching rate below this
level is not optimal, since this implies a too low investment target at the middle-level
and we would fall back to a situation as described in Section 2.4.1. Lump-sum taxes to
fund matching transfers introduce additional, indirect redistribution among regions. In
order to minimize this indirect effect, the high-level government wants γM1 to be as high
as possible. This results in the Nash Equilibrium described above: Matching rates cor-
respond to shares of redistribution c and (b− c), respectively, equalizing the incentives
from the tax system and the redistribution system. Interestingly, the willingness of the
M-government to attract more conditional transfers from the H-government effectively
leads to a reduction of γH1 compared to the corner solution in Section 2.4.1 and to an
equilibrium in which the M-government itself has to provide conditional transfers.7
This result can be related to some interesting patterns in the federal system of the
US. There, federal as well as state governments provide redistribution transfers. Fur-
ther, they all dispose over independent tax autonomy. Our results imply that in this
case state governments want their own regions to strategically under-invest to attract
additional funds from outside regions. Indeed, to correct for strategic behavior of re-
gional and state governments, the US-federal government runs 600 grant programs,
550 of them being categorical. In addition, the federal government provides notable
7Note that this result does not change qualitatively if the assumption of linear utility is relaxed.
The tax and redistribution effects remain active also in this case.
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conditional transfers also to the states; about 85 % of the transfers towards state gov-
ernments are earmarked and destined to be distributed among regions. This suggests
that the federal government is indeed aware of the strategic behavior of both state
and regional governments. Due to its dominant role it can provide sufficient invest-
ment incentives to evade strategic behavior of both levels and assure optimal regional
investment (see Ford (1999) for further details).
2.4.3 High-Level Government without Tax Autonomy
Let us now turn to a federal system such as the EU, where the highest level of gov-
ernment is restricted in its fiscal autonomy. Consider again a federal structure as in
Figure (2.2). However, we now think in terms of two independent nations constitut-
ing a supranational organization. Again, a fixed share c of redistribution authority is
shifted towards the highest level (e.g. the EU). As before, assume that the number
of regions is large and region 1 is poor compared to region 2. Differently from the
analysis in Section 2.4.1 and 2.4.2, only middle-level governments can impose taxes.
For the regional budget constraint this implies Ti = T
M
i . Since the highest level of
government does not dispose over tax autonomy, it looses its preferred instrument to
finance matching grants.
The only way for the high-level government to influence regional decisions is then to
provide its redistribution transfers conditional on regional investment. Technically
speaking, the high-level government then faces the additional constraint
0 ≤ τi + γH · Ii ≤ c ·
(∑4
k=1 Yk(·)
4
− Yi(·)
)
, (2.6)
where τ1 represents a lump sum transfer with τ1 ≥ 0. As before, γH1  [0, 1]. Equation
(2.6) can be interpreted as a constraint to finance matching grants through redistri-
bution funds directed towards this particular region. The total amount of matching
grants payable to a region can not exceed its eligibility for redistribution funds. If
redistribution funds at the high level are available beyond its need to finance matching
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grants, it can in addition pay a lump sum transfers τ1 > 0. On the other hand, this im-
plies that the high level government has no means to provide any funds to rich regions
(Equation (2.6) is then bounded from below and τ2 = γ
H · I2 = 0). For that reason,
the maximization problem of a rich and a poor region are structurally different. Rich
regions face the following maximization objective:
C2 = Y2 + (b− c) ·
(∑2
k Yk
2
− Y2
)
+ c ·
(∑4
k Yk
4
− Y2
)
− (1− γM2 )I2 − TM2 .
They do not receive matching transfers from the H-government but contribute to fi-
nance its redistribution funds towards the poor regions. Using Equation (2.6), the
objective function of a poor region writes
C1 = Y1 + (b− c) ·
(∑2
k Yk
2
− Y1
)
− (1− γM1 − γH1 )I1 − TM1 + τ1.
Poor regions receive matching grants from H- and M-governments. The high level
finances its matching grants through redistribution funds, while the middle level gov-
ernment can impose type specific taxes to finance its investment grants. As before,
the high level government maximizes over four types of regions, while the middle level
government considers two types of regions. Solving this game backwards leads to
Proposition 2.5: Assume that the H-government can finance its matching transfers
through its redistribution funds, only. Then,
i) for a rich region, γM2 > 0 and γ
H
2 = 0 implement I2 = I
M
2 .
ii) for a poor region three cases can be distinguished:
If c > c, then γH1 > 0 and γ
M
1 = 0 implement I1 = I
H
1 .
If c < c < c, then γH1 > 0 and γ
M
1 = 0 implement I
M
1 < I1 < I
H
1 .
If c < c, then γH1 > 0 and γ
M
1 > 0 implement I1 = I
M
1 .
This holds for c =
b
2
ρ1P4
k
Yk
4
−Y1
and c =
b
2
·ρ1P4
k
Yk
4
−Y1+ ρ12
.
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Proof see Appendix 2.6. .
For rich regions, the intuition is straightforward. The high-level government does not
dispose over tax autonomy. Since rich regions contribute to the redistribution system,
the high level does not have means to provide any funds towards rich regions. On the
other hand, the middle-level government finances matching transfers by type specific
taxation as before. It is therefore able to finance matching grants also for the rich.
Because middle-level governments want all their regions to strategically under-invest
(desire to attract redistribution funds from outside regions), they provide too little
matching grants. Accordingly investment in rich regions is below the first best.
Figure (2.3) shows that three cases can be distinguished for poor regions.
Figure 2.3: Implemented Level of Investment for a Poor Region Depending on c
3
I1
c
I1H
γH > 0
γM = 0
γH > 0
γM = 0
1                      2                      3
I1M
γH > 0
γM > 0
In range 3, c is large. The constraint in Equation (2.6) is not binding. The H-
government disposes over sufficient redistribution funds paid by rich regions in order
to implement first best investment, IH1 , in poor regions. This is achieved by providing
redistribution funds towards the poor conditional on investment (see Equation (2.6)).
Redistribution funds which are not needed to provide investment incentives can then
be paid in lump sum form, that is τ1 > 0. This scenario is similar to the corner solution
in Section 2.4.1 with γH1 > 0 and γ
M
1 = 0. The high level government can implement
its desired level of investment in poor regions by providing a sufficient amount of its
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redistribution transfers conditional on investment.
In range 2, the value of c is too low in order to assure that the H-government can
implement its desired target for regional investment. The constraint in Equation (2.6)
is binding. However, c is large enough to allow the H-government to implement a
level of regional investment, which is above the target of the middle-level if it provides
all its redistribution funds to poor regions conditional on investment. Although first
best investment can not be implemented, regions invest above the target of the M-
government, that is IM1 < I1 < I
H
1 . Thus, the latter does not provide any matching
grants towards the poor.
Finally, in range 1, c is small. Redistribution funds disposable at the high-level are too
low to provide sufficient incentives to poor regions to even implement the target of the
M-government, IM1 - even if the H-government provides all its equalization transfers
conditional on regional investment. Since the H-government wants to get as close as
possible to its own investment target, it provides all its available funds conditional on
investment. Therefore, γH1 > 0 and τ1 = 0. The middle-level then provides additional
matching grants until its own target IM1 is implemented, thus γ
M
1 > 0.
The results in this section can be directly related to the federal system of the EU. We
know from Proposition 2.3 that middle level governments also behave strategically in
a federation with three tiers of government. In order to implement optimal regional
investment, the highest level of government has to provide conditional transfers. How-
ever, since the tax autonomy of the EU is restricted, it has no means to influence
decisions in rich regions through matching grants (see Figure (2.1)). Since national
governments do not provide sufficient matching transfers, rich regions in Europe are
likely to under-invest. Also for poor regions, the EU does not seem to dispose over
enough redistribution funds to provide sufficient investment incentives: For low values
of c, corresponding to a limited redistribution autonomy, the EU provides all its redis-
tribution funds conditional on regional investment. Indeed, this is confirmed by Figure
(2.1). Therefore, in terms of our model, the EU-system does most likely correspond
to range 1 or 2 in Figure (2.3): Funds from the EU are exclusively conditional on in-
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vestment suggesting that the EU is bounded in its desire to boost regional investment.
This suggests that funds available at the EU level are not high enough (low value of
c) and that national governments then restrict their conditional transfers to let their
poor regions under-invest. Thus, our analysis suggests that both rich and poor regions
in Europe invest below first best.
2.5 Conclusion
Federal systems are often organized beyond more than two tiers of government. This
paper has proposed a framework to analyze strategic behavior in a three-tiered federal
system. In particular, we investigate federal redistribution accomplished by two differ-
ent tiers of governments when regional investment generates fiscal externalities. Our
model reveals that for a given level of income equalization, a shift in redistribution
power towards the highest level of government reduces the investment targets of the
middle-level government. This may be interpreted as an additional, qualitative effect
of redistribution arising in a federal system with three tiers of government.
Further, we characterize regional investment when the two higher levels of government
engage in corrective policies. In this context we find that the design of the tax systems
to fund corrective matching grants is one key feature in understanding government be-
havior, particularly at the intermediate level. Three cases are distinguished. First, we
imagine mutual federal redistribution when corrective matching transfers are financed
by type specific taxation. This tax schedule does not generate additional incentives and
allows concentrating on the pure disincentive effects from redistribution. The middle
level government wants its own regions to strategically under-invest in order to attract
redistribution funds from outside regions. However, since the highest level govern-
ment accounts for all existing disincentives in the system, in aims at implementing first
best investment. Therefore, in the unique Nash Equilibrium, only the highest level of
government provides conditional transfers.
Second, we generalize this setting by allowing for general lump sum taxes to finance
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corrective matching grants. This tax rule, however, introduces an additional, indirect
redistribution effect at the middle level. Since matching grants from the highest level
are equally financed by all regions, the middle level government wants its own regions
to invest more in order to attract additional conditional transfers from the upper level.
Thus, middle level governments now balance a positive indirect income effect of the tax
system with the negative effect of redistribution. As a result, both high level and middle
level governments provide conditional transfers to implement first best investment in
poor regions.
Third, corresponding to the federal structure of the EU, we assume that only middle
level governments dispose over tax autonomy to finance matching grants. In this case,
the high level government can provide investment incentives towards its poor regions,
only if it imposes investment restrictions on its redistribution funds. Therefore, in-
vestment of poor regions crucially depends on the redistribution autonomy delegated
towards the highest level of government. Only if the upper level disposes over sufficient
redistribution funds, it can provide enough transfers conditional on investment to the
poor regions to assure first best investment. On the other hand, the high level gov-
ernment has no means to provide any funds to rich regions (they contribute to federal
redistribution) resulting in under-investment by the rich.
The implications of our model can be used to explain several features of federalism
in Europe and the US. Results from Section 3.2 directly apply to the federal system
in the US. They suggest that it is mainly the federal government that should provide
investment incentives in order to implement optimal regional investment. This predic-
tion is in line with the increasingly dominant role of the federal government in the US
as well as its increased use of categorical grants in recent years. On the other hand,
our findings in Section 2.4.3 can be related to the federal system in Europe: The EU
does not dispose over tax autonomy. All it can do is to provide its redistribution funds
conditional on investment in order to provide investment incentives at least for poor
regions. While the desired level of redistribution can still be realized, this allows to im-
plement high regional investment. This holds only if the EU disposes over sufficiently
high redistribution funds. The fact that the EU provides all its funds conditional on
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investment is a strong signal for under-investment in both rich and poor regions in Eu-
rope. Thus, our model predicts that national governments are too dominant relative
to EU institutions.
The proposed setting is but a first step in the analysis of more complex federal sys-
tems. There is plenty of scope for future research in this increasingly important field.
In particular, the theoretical foundations for studying complex federal systems remain
weak, especially as regards the behavior of the intermediate government in more com-
plex situations. One example is to extend our framework to incorporate debt policy
and to study the problem of bailouts, which may help to better understand strategic
behavior of regional and state governments. Also it may be interesting to empirically
examine the size of the qualitative effect of mutual redistribution as described in our
framework. This could be particularly insightful for the EU where basically all member
states dispose of at least two tiers of government.
30
2.6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1:
i) Maximizing the objective function of region 1 wrt. I1 yields I
∗
1 =
ρ1(1− b2 )
1−γ1 .
The maximization problem of the central government wrt. γ1 leads to its target for
the marginal productivity of region 1,
∂Y1(I∗1 )
∂I∗1
= 1
1− b
2
+
U′2
U′1
· b
2
. These two results determine
the optimal matching rate,
γ1 = 1−
1− b
2
(1− b
2
+
U ′2
U ′1
· b
2
)
.
This matching rate implements first best investment.
ii) If region 1 is poor compared to a region of type 2, then U ′1 > U
′
2. Substituting this
in γ1 yields the result. 
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Proof of Proposition 2.2:
i) Deriving the objective function of the regional government wrt. I1 yields the FOC
of the regional government:
U(C1)
∂I1
=
(
∂Y1(I1)
∂I1
(1− (b− c)− c)− 1
)
= 0.
Transformation leads to
I∗1 = ρ1 · (1− b) .
Derivation wrt. b yields the result.
ii) Deriving Equation (2.4) wrt. I1 yields the FOC of the M-government:
∂WM
∂I1
=
(
∂Y1(I1)
∂I1
· (1 + (b− c)(1
2
− 1) + c(1
4
− 1))− 1
)
+
(
∂Y1(I1)
∂I1
· (b− c)(1
2
) + c(1
4
) · ∂Y1(I1)
∂I1
)
= 0.
This simplifies to
IM = ρ1 ·
(
1− c
2
)
.
Derivation wrt. c yields the result.
iii) Deriving Equation (2.5) wrt. I1 yields the FOC of the H-government:
∂WM
∂I1
=
(
∂Y1(I1)
∂I1
· (1 + (b− c)(1
2
− 1) + c(1
4
− 1))− 1
)
+
(
∂Y1(I1)
∂I1
· (b− c)(1
2
) + c(1
4
) · ∂Y1(I1)
∂I1
)
+
(
c(1
4
) · ∂Y1(I1)
∂I1
)
+
(
c(1
4
) · ∂Y1(I1)
∂I1
)
= 0.
This simplifies to
IH1 = ρ1.
Derivation wrt. b and c yields the result.
iv) Comparing the preferred marginal productivity levels of the M- and the regional
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government yields
1
(1− b) >
1
(1− c
2
)
for b, c  (0, 1] and b ≥ c. Comparing the preferred marginal productivity level of the
H- and the M-government yields
1 >
1
(1− c
2
)
.
for c  (0, 1]. It follows directly that I∗1 < I
M
1 < I
H
1 . 
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Proof of Proposition 2.3:
The proof consists of four steps:
1. The maximization problem of a region of type 1 yields FOC
U(C1)
∂I1
=
(
∂Y1(I1)
∂I1
(1− b)− (1− γMi − γHi )
)
= 0.
This simplifies to
I∗1 =
ρ1(1− b)
1− γM1 − γH1
.
2. The M-government chooses γM1 by maximizing its objective function wrt. γ
M
1 . Its
FOC writes
∂WM
∂γM1
=
(
∂Y1(I∗1 )
∂I∗1
∂I∗1
∂γM1
· (1 + (b− c)(1
2
− 1) + c(1
4
− 1))− ∂I∗1
∂γM1
)
+
(
∂Y1(I∗1 )
∂I∗1
∂I∗1
∂γM1
· (b− c)(1
2
) + c · (1
4
) · ∂Y1(I∗1 )
∂I∗1
∂I∗1
∂γM1
)
= 0.
This yields the reaction function of the M-government
γMi = 1− γHi −
1− b
(1− c
2
)
.
3. The H-government chooses γH1 by maximizing its objective function wrt. γ
H
1 . Its
FOC writes
∂WH
∂γH1
=
(
∂Y1(I∗1 )
∂I∗1
∂I∗1
∂γH1
· (1 + (b− c)(1
2
− 1) + c(1
4
− 1))− ∂I∗1
∂γH1
)
+
(
∂Y1(I∗1 )
∂I∗1
∂I∗1
∂γH1
· (b− c) · (1
2
) + c(1
4
) · ∂Y1(I∗1 )
∂I∗1
∂I∗1
∂γH1
)
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+c · (1
4
) · ∂Y1(I∗1 )
∂I∗1
∂I∗1
∂γH1
+ c · (1
4
) · ∂Y1(I∗1 )
∂I∗1
∂I∗1
∂γH1
= 0.
This yields the reaction function of the H-government,
γH1 = b− γM1 .
4. To determine the Simultaneous Move Nash Equilibrium, substitute γH1 in the reac-
tion function of the M-government. This leads to
γM1 = 1− b+ γM1 −
1− b
(1− c
2
)
.
There is no interior solution for this problem.
Two potential corner solutions need to be verified given the parameter restrictions
γH1 , γ
M
1  [0, 1]:
a): γH1 = 0: In this case, γ
M
1 = 1− 1−b(1− c
2
)
. This in γH1 = b− γM1 yields
γH1 = (1− b) · (
c
2
1− c
2
) > 0.
This is a contradiction.
b): γM1 = 0: In this case, the reaction function of the H-government yields γ
H
1 = b.
This in the reaction function of the M-government leads to γM1 = (1 − b)( −
c
2
1− c
2
) < 0.
The non zero constraint is binding. Therefore,
γM1 = 0.
The unique Simultaneous Move Nash Equilibrium of this game is a corner solution.
It remains to be shown that γH1 is the first best matching rate of the H-government
and therefore implements IH1 : With γ
M
1 and γ
H
1 from step 4, the optimality condition
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of the regional government 1, I∗1 =
ρ1(1−b)
1−γM1 −γH1
, leads to
I∗1 =
ρ1(1− b)
1− b = ρ1.
This is identical to the first best marginal productivity level desired by the high-level
government. Thus, γM1 and γ
H
1 determined in step 4 implement I
H
1 . 
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Proof of Proposition 2.4:
The proof consists of four steps:
1. The maximization problem of a region of type 1 yields FOC
U(C1)
∂I1
=
(
∂Y1(I1)
∂I1
(1− b)− (1− γMi − γHi )
)
= 0.
This simplifies to
I∗1 =
ρ1(1− b)
1− γMi − γHi
.
2. The M-government chooses γM by maximizing its objective function wrt. γM . Its
FOC writes
∂WM
∂γM1
=
∂Y1(I∗1 )
∂I∗1
∂I∗1
∂γM1
· (1 + (b− c)( 1
2N
− 1) + c( 1
4N
− 1))+ (1− 1
2N
) · I∗1
−
(
(1− γMi − γHi ) + γ
M
1
2N
+
γH1
4N
∂I∗1
∂γM1
)
+
(
∂Y1(I∗1 )
∂I∗1
∂I∗1
∂γM1
· ((b− c)( 1
2N
) + c( 1
4N
)
)− (γM1
2N
+
γH1
4N
)
∂I∗1
∂γM1
)
= 0.
This yields the reaction function of the M-government
γM1 = 1− γH1 −
4− 2 · b− c
4
.
3. The H-government chooses γH1 by maximizing its objective function wrt. γ
H
1 . Its
FOC writes
∂WH
∂γH1
=
∂Y1(I∗1 )
∂I∗1
∂I∗1
∂γH1
· (1 + (b− c)(1
2
− 1) + c(1
4
− 1))+ (1− 1
4
) · I∗1
−
(
(1− γMi − γHi ) + γ
M
1
2
+
γH1
4
)
∂I∗1
∂γH1
+
(
∂Y1(I∗1 )
∂I∗1
∂I∗1
∂γH1
· ((b− c)(1
2
) + c · (1
4
)
)− (1
4
) · I∗1 − (γ
M
1
2N
+
γH1
4
)
∂I∗1
∂γH1
)
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+
(
c · (1
4
) · ∂Y1(I∗1 )
∂I∗1
∂I∗1
∂γH1
− (1
4
) · I∗1 − (γ
H
1
4
)
∂I∗1
∂γH1
)
+
(
c · (1
4
) · ∂Y1(I∗1 )
∂I∗1
∂I∗1
∂γH1
− (1
4
) · I∗1 − (γ
H
1
4
)
∂I∗1
∂γH1
)
= 0.
This yields the reaction function of the H-government
γH1 = b− γM1 .
4. To determine the Simultaneous Move Nash Equilibrium, we substitute γH1 in the
reaction function of the M-government. This yields γM1 = 1−b+γM1 − 1−b(1− c
2
)
·
(
1− b−γM1
2
)
,
which simplifies to
γM1 = b− c > 0.
Substitution into the reaction function of the H-government leads directly to
γH1 = c.
This is an interior solution.
We still need to check two potential corner solutions given the parameter restrictions
γH1 , γ
M
1  [0, 1]:
a): γH1 = 0: In this case γ
M
1 = 1− 1−b(1− c
2
)
. This together with γH1 = b− γM1 yields
γH1 = (1− b) · (
c
2
1− c
2
) > 0.
This is a contradiction.
b): γM1 = 0: In this case γ
H
1 = b. This together with γ
M
1 = 1− γH1 − 1−b(1− c
2
)
·
(
1− γH1
2
)
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yields
γM1 = (1− b)(1−
1− b
2
1− c
2
) > 0
for b > c. This is again a contradiction. The unique equilibirium of this game is the
interior solution characterized above.
It remains to be shown that γH1 and γ
M
1 together implement first best investment, I
H
1 .
With γM1 and γ
H
1 from step 4, the optimality condition of the regional government,
∂Y1(I1)
∂I1
=
1−γM1 −γH1
1−b , yields
∂Y1(I1)
∂I1
=
1− b+ c− c
1− b = 1.
This is identical to the first best marginal productivity desired by the H-government.
Hence, γM1 and γ
H
1 determined in step 4 yield regional first best investment I
H
1 .
In the unique Nash Equilibrium, H- and M-governments are characterized by the
same investment target. This can be seen from the optimality condition of the M-
government,
∂Y1(I∗1 )
∂IM1
(1 − c
2
) = 1 − γH1
2
. Together with the matching rates from step 4,
this simplifies to
∂Y1(I
∗
1 )
∂IM1
= 1
corresponding to the marginal productivity target of the H-government. 
39
Proof of Proposition 2.5:
i) Solving the maximization problem of a rich region (type 2) yields
I∗2 =
ρ2(4− 2 · b− c)
4 · (1− γM2 )
.
The maximization problem of the M-government for the rich region yields
γM2 = 1−
4− 2 · b− c
4− 2c .
This matching rate implements the regional investment target of the M-government,
IM2 = ρ1 · (1−
c
2
) < ρ1.
Investment in rich regions is below first best.
ii) Solving the maximization problem of the poor region yields
I∗1 =
ρ1(1− b2)
1− γH1 − γM1
.
Similar to the approach in Proposition 4.2, we derive reaction functions
γM1 = 1− γH1 −
1− b
2
1− c
2
for the M-government and
γH1 = 1− γM1 −
(
1− b
2
)
for the H-government. Solving the simultaneous move game by plugging reaction func-
tions into each other reveals again that there is no interior solution for this problem.
Two potential corner solutions remain to be checked given the restriction on parame-
40
ters, γH1 , γ
M
1  [0, 1]:
a): γH1 = 0: In this case γ
M
1 = 1 − 1−
b
2
1− c
4
. This together with γH1 = 1 − γM1 −
(
1− b
2
)
yields
γH1 =
1− b
2
1− c
4
−
(
1− b
2
)
> 0,
which is a contradiction.
b): γM1 = 0: In this case γ
H
1 = 1 −
(
1− b
2
)
= b
2
. This in the reaction function of the
M-government yields
γM1 =
(
1− b
2
)
− 1−
b
2
1− c
2
< 0.
The non zero constraint is binding. Therefore, γM1 = 0. This is the unique Simultaneous
Move Nash Equilibrium with γH1 =
b
2
and γM1 = 0, a corner solution. This holds for
γH1 · I1 ≤ c ·
(P4
k Yk(·)
4
− Y1(·)
)
or
c > c =
b
2
ρ1P4
k Yk
4
− Y1
.
In this case τi > 0.
Besides this unrestricted solution with large c, we also have to consider the case where
c is small. This distinction allows for two additional sub cases:
i): c small: holds for γH1 < γ
M∗
1 and γ
H
1 ≤ (1 − 1−
b
2
1− c
2
). In this case we know that
γM1 + γ
H
1 = (1− 1−
b
2
1− c
2
) and I1 = ρ1 ·
(
1− c
2
)
.
The M-government implements its suboptimal desired level of investment. This holds
if γH ·I1 ≥ (1− 1−
b
2
1− c
2
) ·ρ1 ·
(
1− c
2
)
. Together, this yields γH ·I1 ≥ (1− 1−
b
2
1− c
2
) ·ρ1 ·
(
1− c
2
)
>
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c ·
(P4
k Yk(·)
4
− Y1(·)
)
which simplifies to
c < c =
b
2
· ρ1P4
k Yk(·)
4
− Y1(·) + ρ12
.
ii): Finally, IM1 ≤ Ii ≤ IH1 if c lies between the two margins determined above:
b
2
ρ1P4
k Yk
4
− Y1
= c > c > c =
b
2
ρ1P4
k Yk
4
− Y1 + ρ12
.
However, note that the left hand side and the right hand side are evaluated at different
levels of regional investment (I1 = ρ1, the first best on the left hand side and I1 =
ρ1 ·
(
1− c
2
)
, the target of the middle-level on the right hand side). To show that this
range exists, we need to show that[(∑4
k Yk
4
− Y1
)
|I1 = ρ1
]
<
[(∑4
k Yk
4
− Y1
)
|I1 = ρ1 ·
(
1− c
2
)]
,
With the production function defined in section 2.3, this can also be written as
∑4
k ρk · ln(ρk)
4
− ρ1 · ln(ρ1) <
∑4
k ρk · ln
(
ρk ·
(
1− c
2
))
4
− ρ1 · ln
(
ρ1 ·
(
1− c
2
))
By transforming left- and right-hand side, one can easily show that this inequality is
indeed true. 
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Chapter 3
The Composition of Public
Investment and Fiscal Federalism:
Panel Data Evidence From Europe1
3.1 Introduction
Public investment has received only limited academic attention as an aggregate vari-
able, and its composition has to our knowledge received none at all, at least in the
European context. This paper seeks to fill that gap at least in part by presenting an
empirical analysis of what drives different types of public investment, with a special
focus on the impact of fiscal federalism.
Though public investment is an important variable in economics, its nature, drivers,
and impact are still not completely understood. Most notably, there is often confusion
about what it is in the first place. Perhaps the most prominent example of this type of
confusion is the customary synonymous use of ”public investment” and ”infrastructure
investment” in much of economic literature. There is, however, a great deal of infras-
tructure investment that is not public, and there is a great deal of public investment
1This chapter is based on Kappeler and Va¨lila¨ 2008. The theory part and most of the robustness
checks are extensions presented only in this thesis.
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that is not infrastructure investment. While it is well-known that many roads, water
and sanitation networks, and municipal swimming pools are publicly funded and pro-
vided, both economic theory and empirical analyses have hardly distinguished between
them when studying what determines ”public investment” or how productive ”public
investment” is.
We are interested in the impact of decentralization on the composition of public in-
vestment. In doing so, we refer to the regional competition literature by arguing
that regions compete for private capital by increasing the provision of more produc-
tive investment relative to less productive investment. However, there are two points
worthwhile noting in advance: First, while this strand of literature concentrates on the
composition of public expenditure as a whole, we apply this theory to the composition
of public investment. This, however, can be done without difficulty. Second, in our
empirical analysis we concentrate on regional competition (and therefore regional de-
centralization) rather than competition among nations to explain the level of different
types of public investment. Thereby we account for the fact that public investment is
mostly conducted at the regional level - though often influenced by the central gov-
ernment, e.g. by earmarked grants. We also argue that concentrating on regional
competition constitutes a lower bound case: Regional and national governments have
similar investment targets if externalities arise at both levels. This holds since both
tiers of government in this case are biased into the same direction. Thus, national
competition renders the effect observable at the regional level weaker. Therefore, sig-
nificant decentralization parameters in our analysis represent kind of a lower bound
case and would support the hypotheses that regional competition in public inputs does
exist in Europe.
The theory of fiscal federalism - or any other theory for that matter - does not deal
explicitly with the composition of public investment. At best, it distinguishes between
consumption-oriented public expenditure and public expenditure to produce ”public
inputs” for the production processes of private firms. In what is to come we do not con-
sider differences between current public spending and public investment per se; rather,
we consider the various types of public investment as enhancements of production po-
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tential for different public services. Thus, infrastructure investment is considered to
produce more future transportation services, and redistribution investment is consid-
ered to produce, e.g., more future recreation services. This perspective allows us to
link the theory of fiscal federalism with the kind of data on the composition of public
investment that we have.
The traditional theory of fiscal federalism is based on the seminal contributions by
Tiebout (1956), Oates (1972), and Musgrave (1959). The underlying assumptions in-
clude, most importantly, the benevolence of the policy-maker in the centre (that is, his
objective is the maximization of social welfare); the existence of pure local public goods
and global public goods (whose benefits accrue locally and nation-wide, respectively);
benefit taxation (same incidence for the cost and benefit of public spending); factor
mobility; and absence of spill-over effects of fiscal decisions horizontally (between re-
gions) and vertically (between regions and the centre). Considering the responsiveness
of public spending to local preferences and the creation of incentives for economic effi-
ciency as policy goals, the theory derives normative conclusions about the optimal task
assignment between the central and sub-national levels of government. Responsiveness
to local preferences implies that decentralization and fiscal competition are preferable
in the provision of local public goods whenever local preferences are heterogeneous. On
the other hand, centralization is warranted in the provision of public goods whose opti-
mal supply cannot be achieved by fiscal competition. Such goods include most notably
global public goods, and it also includes the macroeconomic stabilization and income
redistribution functions of the government (which may be interpreted as providing
global public goods as well). Finally, public goods may also have spillover effects, with
one region benefiting from a highway built by its neighboring region, for example. Fis-
cal competition among sub-national levels of government will result in a sub-optimally
low level of provision of such goods, as regions do not consider the spillover benefits
in their individual decision-making. Oates (1972) suggests that the optimal provision
can be achieved by means of matching grants from the centre, which act to internalize
the externality.
More recent literature on fiscal federalism has relaxed the assumption of no spillover
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effects in policy-making. Focusing on horizontal policy spillovers, consider regional tax
competition. With capital mobile across regions that seek to attract it, tax competition
can lead to sub-optimally low tax rates (”race to the bottom”) and, as a consequence,
insufficient provision of public services (both public consumption goods and ”infras-
tructure”). In this sense, also Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) is a standard reference.
Also, Hulten and Schwab (1997) discuss the circumstances where tax competition can
lead to a sub-optimally low level of public capital. Competition between regions for an
industry with external scale economies is a case in point: in competing for the location
of such an industry, regions may reduce their tax rates so low as to unduly suppress
public investment.
Several authors have come out against the assumptions in Zodrow and Mieszkowski
(1986). E.g. Noiset (1995) argues that regional competition for private capital may
reduce marginal costs up to a level where it actually increases the provision of public
inputs. Also Keen and Marchand (1997) emphasize that the marginal cost for pro-
viding one additional unit of a public input does not necessarily exceed its additional
gross return to capital (see also Matsumoto (1998) and Sinn (2003)). This holds if
private capital reacts relatively strong to an increase in pubic inputs. Thus, relaxing
the assumptions imposed by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) renders over-provision of
public inputs more likely. Considering the impact of fiscal competition on the compo-
sition of public expenditure, Keen and Marchand (1997) also argue that uncoordinated
fiscal competition induces regions to over-invest in ”local public inputs” at the cost
of (consumption-oriented) local public goods. Investment in public inputs increases
the potential of regions to attract mobile private capital, since public inputs reduce
production costs for private firms. This generates distortions in the composition of
public expenditure. Decentralization leads to an over-supply of public inputs and an
under-supply of local public goods.
To sum up, fiscal competition has been argued to reduce public investment across the
board (tax competition), but it has also been argued to boost productive public invest-
ment, at least relative to local public goods (broader fiscal competition). In terms of
the public investment types in Table 1, these results would imply that decentralization
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increases investment in Infrastructure as well as Hospitals and Schools, while reducing
investment in Redistribution, at least in relative terms. This contrasts, notably, with
the hypotheses above based on the older fiscal federalism literature, which suggests
that regional tax-competition leads to under-provision of any kind of public goods.
As regards empirical literature, different types of public investment are rarely com-
pared. Empirical work on the composition of public spending mostly refers to pro-
ductive vs. unproductive public expenditure rather than different categories of public
investment (Arze del Granado et al. (2005), Gonzalez Alegre (2006a), or Hauptmeier
(2007)). There is one empirical paper on Bolivian data by Faguet (2004) investigating
different types of public investment. However, he concentrates on the responsiveness
of regional governments to local needs by focusing on one particular reform, only. As
regards input competition in Europe, Devereux and Griffith (1998) and Devereux and
Freeman (1995) argue that competition for private capital indeed does occur among
EU countries. They analyze FDI flows from the US to several EU countries and do
find competition effects. Further, Benassy-Quere et al. (2005) also show that input
competition is an issue among EU-countries.
In the following, we derive hypotheses about the link between fiscal decentralization and
the composition of public investment in Section 3.2 We then decompose public invest-
ment into different types with distinctly different economic characteristics in Section
3.3. Section 3.4 seeks to articulate empirical tests of the hypotheses, and results are
interpreted from an economic perspective, before concluding in Section 3.5.
3.2 Modelling the Composition of Public Spending
This section presents an analytical framework based on Keen and Marchand (1997) to
investigate the partly conflicting arguments on the provision of public inputs in more
detail.2 Consider the following utility function of a representative regional voter:
2Compared to the more general treatment in Keen and Marchand (1997), we disregard the labor
market and only consider capital taxation. Though less general, this framework establishes the same
results, which are of interest for the empirical analysis below.
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V = V (X,G).
X is a private good and G is a public consumption good. Regional governments also
provide a public input P , which directly enters the production function as specified
below. Public goods G and P , can be financed either by a capital tax τ , or by a lump
sum tax T . T is imposed independently of where companies locate. This leads to the
following budget constraint of the public sector:
P +G = τ ·K + T
The production function is defined by
F = F (P,K(P, τ)).
K depends on the level of public inputs and on tax rate τ . Private capital inflows
increase in P , ∂K
∂P
> 0, implying that private capital in this region increases in the
provision of public inputs. On the other hand, investors try to evade taxes. Therefore,
capital inflows decrease in τ , ∂K
∂τ
< 0. The firm’s objective is to maximize profits:
R = F (P,K)− (r + τ) ·K − T.
For perfectly mobile capital, the marginal product of capital equals its gross return
(r + τ = FK), which directly results from the profit-maximization objective of private
firms. Thus, the private budget constraint can be written as
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X = F (P,K)− (r + τ) ·K + ρ ·K − T.
Consumption of good X equals production minus expenses for input K plus net return
ρ (with r = ρ+ τ) from privately owned capital in this region (K) minus the lump sum
tax. Substituting public and private budget constraints in the utility function yields
the objective function of the government:
maxV (X,G) = V
(
F (P,K)− (r + τ) ·K + ρ ·K − T, τ ·K(τ) + T − P) (3.1)
3.2.1 Two Forms of Competition for Private Capital
Maximizing Equation (3.1) with respect to T and τ , respectively, leads to the following
quantitative result on the provision of public goods G and P .
Proposition 3.1: Assume that the stock of private capital invested in the region de-
pends negatively on τ and positively on public input P . Then, compared to first best
provision, financing public input P and public consumption good G through a capital
tax τ leads to under-provision of G, while P may be either under- or over-provided.
Proof see Appendix 3.6. .
Two externalities distort the provision of P . First, the presence of a distortionary
tax instrument negatively affects the level of public inputs: Regions want to attract
additional capital at the cost of other regions resulting into a race to the bottom in
capital taxes. Second, regions benefit from a higher level of P through its positive effect
on private capital inflows. This constitutes an additional externality, which distorts
the level of P in the opposite direction: Regions compete in the provision of P in order
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to attract private capital. The more public inputs are available in a region, the more
attractive it is for private firms to invest. Since it is not clear, which effect prevails,
public input provision may be either too high or too low.
As regards public services, there is only one of the two effects in place. Distortionary
capital taxes generate regional tax competition and thereby an inefficiently low level
of G. Since G does not affect the private capital invested in a region, no strategic
competition in G arises. There is no additional positive externality that might shift
the provision of public consumption goods upwards. After all, marginal utility exceeds
marginal costs implying strategic under-provision of local public services.
Concerning our empirical analysis on the composition of public investment, Proposition
1 implies that we expect decentralization to reduce investment in Redistribution. On
the other hand, it is not clear whether decentralization increases or decreases the level
of public investment in Infrastructure.
3.2.2 Composition of Public Investment
Based on the quantitative effects examined above, Keen and Marchand (1997) argue
that uncoordinated fiscal competition induces regions to over-invest in public inputs
relative to public services. To see this, consider the differential of the utility function
defined above:
dV = VX · dX + VG · dG. (3.2)
From the private budget constraint we know that dX = FP · dP and from the public
budget constraint that dG = −dP . Substituting yields
dV =
(
FP − VG
VX
)
VX · dP
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With this expression, we can test how utility changes, if, everything else constant,
expenditure is shifted from G towards P :
Proposition 3.2: Holding capital tax τ constant, at a symmetric non-cooperative
equilibrium, welfare increases through a small shift of expenditure from P towards G.
Proof see Appendix 3.6. .
Regions can attract private capital by increasing the supply of P relative to G. Ad-
ditional supply of P can attract private capital, while this is not possible with higher
levels of G. On the other hand, the financing of additional public inputs through a
distortionary capital tax negatively affects the level of private capital invested in this
region. Thus, there are two externalities arising in context with the provision of pub-
lic inputs in a region. This line of argument has direct implications for the relative
composition of public investment in terms of P and G: P is overprovided relative to
G in order to attract additional private capital. Welfare is thus unambiguously in-
creased by a revenue neutral rebalancing of expenditures from P towards G. Note that
Proposition 3.2 does not refer to over- or under-provision of public inputs in absolute
terms. What it does say is that we can expect regional competition for private capital
to increase productive investment (e.g. in Infrastructure and Hospitals and Schools)
relative to public consumption goods (e.g. investment in Redistribution).
It is also worthwhile noting that Proposition 3.2 explicitly deals with welfare. However,
it is difficult to empirically verify welfare implications of a certain policy tool. Also,
the following empirical analysis will concentrate on levels of different types of public
investment rather than shares. We therefore focus mainly on Proposition 3.1 for the
economic interpretation of our results.
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3.3 Composition of Public Investment in Europe:
Stylized Facts
Based on the functional classification of government expenditure in the 1993 UN System
of National Accounts and in the 1995 European System of Accounts (ESA 95), Eurostat
provides a breakdown of public investment for EU countries starting in the early 1990s.
Complete data are available for EU15 countries from 1995 (i.e, the introduction of ESA
95) through 2005.3 However, many countries have back-dated their time series to 1990.
The ”public investment” variable is gross capital formation of the general government.
This includes changes in inventories, which may create some undesired noise for our
analysis; however, the breakdown between gross fixed capital formation and changes
in inventories is not available.
The functional breakdown of public investment is presented in Table 3.1. The right-
hand side column shows the functional classification (Classification of Functions of
Government, COFOG for short) in ESA 95. The left-hand side shows our aggregation
of the 10 available ”functions” into four types of public investment with economically
distinct roles. This aggregation will be used in the remainder of this paper.
Table 3.1: Functional Breakdown of Public Investment
Types of Investment ESA 95 COFOG
1. Infrastructure (INF) Economic Affairs;
2. Hospitals and Schools (HS) Health;
Education;
3. Public Goods (PG) Defence;
General Public Services;
Environment;
Order and Safety;
4. Redistribution (RED) Housing;
Recreation;
Social Protection
3EU15 comprises Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
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The four different types of public investment affect the economy through different
channels, with varying degrees of directness, and over different time horizons. Public
investment in Infrastructure, consisting of just Economic Affairs in the ESA 95 CO-
FOG,4 seeks to measure public investment in traditional infrastructure, mainly trans-
port. This type of public investment has the most direct economic impact by reducing
firms’ production and transaction costs. The economic impact of public investment in
Hospitals and Schools is more long-term and less direct in character, as it facilitates the
building up and maintenance of the economy’s stock of human capital. Investment in
Public Goods affects the economy’s allocative efficiency indirectly through framework
conditions for productive activity. Finally, Redistribution affects the economy’s income
distribution rather than allocative or productive efficiency per se.
In addition to the composition of Infrastructure investment, some other aggregates
shown in Table 1 contain undesirable ”noise” as no further breakdowns of the right-
hand side ”functions” are available. For example, public investment in water supply and
wastewater management are not part of Infrastructure as one would wish; instead, they
are part of Redistribution (Housing) and Public Goods (Environment), respectively.
Similarly, one would wish to include street lightning in Public Goods; now it is in
Housing and thereby Redistribution. However, as with Infrastructure, we expect such
”noise” to be of sufficiently small magnitude so as not to invalidate the empirical
analysis below.
4Economic Affairs comprise a number of different sectors, including agriculture; fuel and energy;
mining, manufacturing, and construction; transport; communication; R and D; and others. Among
these sectors, transport is likely to be by far the dominant recipient of public investment. Note
that investment by energy companies owned by the public sector, for example, is classified as private
investment in national accounts statistics as long as such companies are commercially run.
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3.4 Empirical Analysis
Based on the theoretical findings in Section 3.2, Section 3.4 empirical investigates
the impact of decentralization on the level of each type of public investment. Before
presenting the methodologies and results of these analyses, we specify the model to be
estimated.
3.4.1 Model Specification
The hypotheses formulated in Section 3.2 are based on literature, which considers pro-
ductive vs. unproductive public spending. We directly apply these findings to analyze
the composition of more productive vs. less productive types of public investment,
only. For this reason we specify a reduced-form model to be estimated. In so doing we
seek to identify exogenous variables measuring the impact of decentralization on pub-
lic investment, as well as a set of control variables that render the model empirically
well-specified.
The reduced-form specification to be used is as follows:
Ic,it = α+β1taxit−1+β2capit+β3gdpit−1+β4debtit−1+β5lendit−1+β6popit−1+β7yeart+
γi + uit
where uit i.i.d (0,σ
2), with subscript i referring to observations in the cross-section
dimension (individual countries) and t to observations in the time dimension. The
dependent variable Ic represents public investment of type c, with c  1, . . . , 4 as shown
in Table 1. In the analysis Ic is expressed relative to trend GDP,
5 thus in theory
assuming values in <+.
Our primary interest is in the share of tax revenue attributed to sub-national levels of
5Considering ratios to (trend) GDP improves the time series properties of the variables and facili-
tates the economic interpretation of the estimation results. Note that trend GDP is calculated using
the Hodrick-Prescott Filter with a smoothing parameter λ = 100.
54
government (regional and local governments), which is denoted tax.6 As regards the
control variables, they seek to capture the general economic, fiscal, and demographic
developments of significance for the determination of public investment. We control
for investment grants from the central government to sub-national levels of government
(cap); in the empirical analyses it is measured in relation to trend GDP.7 The tax share
is lagged by one period to reflect the fact that investment decisions are most often taken
a year before, based on knowledge about the revenue situation at that time. In contrast,
capital transfers are contemporaneous with investment, as they finance investment the
same year it is undertaken 8 Real GDP, denoted gdp in (1), is measured in per capita
terms and lagged by one period to remove any simultaneity bias. The short- and longer
term fiscal environment is captured by the budget surplus of the general government
(lend) and public debt (debt). Both are measured in relation to trend GDP and lagged
by one period, for the reasons mentioned above. We also control for population (pop).9
γi denotes unobserved time-invariant country-specific effects that are included in the
estimations. Finally, as explained below in greater detail, a linear time trend (year) is
included, as some of the time series are trend stationary.
3.4.2 Sample Properties
The main sample used in the estimations consists of a panel of EU10 countries (EU15
less the Cohesion countries less Luxembourg) during the period 1990-2005. Data are
from Eurostat’s New Cronos and OECD statistics. Time series for FDI-stocks, fiscal
6See Stegarescu (2005). We also considered other measures of decentralization, including total
revenue share of sub-national levels of government; expenditure share of sub-national levels of govern-
ment; and the ratio of sub-national tax revenue to expenditure. However, none of these alternative
measures is conceptually superior to the tax share variable used, and all of them are empirically
inferior, as they risk spurious correlation by including capital transfers (total revenue share) or the
dependent variable (expenditure share), or by exhibiting non-stationarity (sub-national revenue-to
expenditure ratio).
7The interaction term of tax and cap turned out to be insignificant in most of the estimations
below and is therefore not reported.
8See Rodden (2003) for more details.
9As a robustness check we also considered unemployment, birth rates, migration rates, and mor-
tality rates as additional control variables. They turned out to be mostly insignificant and did not
change the estimation results materially.
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variables (budgetary surplus, public debt, and decentralization measures), and popu-
lation come from the OECD. Not all countries have back-dated all relevant series to
1990, so the panel is unbalanced.
Summary statistics are provided in Table 3.14 (Appendix 3.7). Overall the standard
deviation is about 1/2 to 1/3 of the mean. Although this variation in the data is
relatively low compared to large sample studies, it is still in line with other studies
using national data such as Stegarescu (2005). The summary statistics also reveal that
the three decentralization measures (taxsh, tDec1, and tDec3) used in this study have
similar statistical properties.
Unit root tests indicate that our variables are either stationary or trend stationary
(Appendix 3.7, Table 3.16), thus warranting the inclusion of a time trend as another
explanatory variable. We perform Levin, Lin, and Chu test (LLC), [see Levin et al.
(2002)] as well as Im, Pesaran and Chin test (IPS); [see Im et al. (1997)] to verify the
stationarity properties of our variables.
The dependent variables are highly autocorrelated and persistent (Appendix 3.7, Table
3.17), with first-order autocorrelation coefficients between 0.8 and 0.9 for all types of
public investment.
3.4.3 Methodology
The high autocorrelation in our dependent variables suggests a dynamic specification
of model (1):
Ic,it = α+β1Ic,it−1+β2taxit−1+β3capit+β4gdpit−1+β5debtit−1+β6lendit−1+β7popit−1+
β8yeart + γi + uit
The estimation of specification (2) will have to account for the correlation between
the regressors (lagged dependent) and the composite term ( γi + uit), which renders
least squares estimators inconsistent even asymptotically. To circumvent this problem
we employ General Method of Moments (GMM) estimation, which has become the
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workhorse in estimating dynamic panel data models.
The intuition underlying GMM estimation is a follows. According to Arellano and
Bond (1991) and Bond (2002) the levels equation is first-differenced, which eliminates
the fixed effects γi, as well as the time trend. A set of (internal) instrumental variables
is then specified that are orthogonal to the error term. Assuming that the error term is
not serially correlated and that the explanatory variables are weakly exogenous, higher-
order lags of the dependent variable (Ic,it−2,Ic,it−3,· · · ) constitute valid instruments.10
This results in the following set of instruments
Zi =

Ic,t−2 0 0 · · · 0 · · · 0
0 Ic,it−2 Ic,it−3 · · · 0 · · · 0
· · · · · · · · · · ·
0 · 0 · · · Ic,it−2 · · · Ic,i1
 .
While identification requires the number of instruments to equal the number of ex-
planatory variables, overidentification is in practice necessary, as it both allows the
testing of the moment conditions, as explained below, and improves efficiency.11 The
orthogonality requirement is equivalent to conditions on the first moment of the sample
data.
E(Z ′c,i M ui) = 0 for i = 1, 2, ..., N
where M ui = (M ui3,M ui4, ...,M uiT )′. The fulfillment of these moment conditions is a
sufficient condition for the asymptotic consistency of GMM estimators. The derivation
of the GMM estimators can be done in one or two steps (labeled 1-step and 2-step
GMM estimation), which are asymptotically equivalent under homoskedasticity of the
error term. The two step estimator computes consistent estimate M̂ ui
′
in the first step,
which are then used in the second step to minimize
10Higher-order lags of other explanatory variables can also be used as instruments under the same
assumptions.
11Note that GMM estimation dominates least squares estimation with instrumental variables, as
GMM can be shown to be asymptotically efficient, which is not the case for least squares estimation
with instrumental variables.
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JN =
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
M u′iZc,i
)
WN
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
Z ′c,i M ui
)
(3.3)
using weighting matrix
WN =
[
1
N
N∑
i=1
Z ′c,iM̂ uiM̂ ui
′
Zc,i
]−1
. (3.4)
Instead, the one step estimator directly minimizes
WN =
[
1
N
N∑
i=1
Z ′c,iHZc,i
]−1
(3.5)
where H is a (T-2) square matrix with 2’s on the main diagonal, -1’s on the first
off-diagonals and zero elsewhere. The 2-step procedure is more efficient under het-
eroskedasticity.
To test the validity of the moment conditions, the number of instruments has to exceed
the number of explanatory variables. With overidentification, two tests suffice to assess
whether the model is well-specified. First, the Sargan test for overidentifying restric-
tions is conducted to test the joint orthogonality of all instruments. Second, the serial
correlation properties of the error term are tested; more specifically, tests developed
by Arellano and Bond (1991) allow us to assess whether first order serial correlation is
present in the error term (as it should, as our regression equation is estimated in first
differences) and whether second order serial correlation is absent (as it should).
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3.4.4 Basic Results
Table 2 presents the results of the preferred estimation method, which is one-step
difference-GMM. We present results for total expenditure, overall investment, and the
four investment types (all relative to trend GDP).
One-step difference-GMM estimation is alone in passing the Sargan test for overiden-
tifying restrictions and residual autocorrelation tests (labeled m1 for first-order and
m2 for second-order autocorrelation) for all four estimated models in levels. Two-
step difference-GMM estimation is associated with the absence of first-degree residual
autocorrelation throughout.
As shown in Appendix 3.7, the residuals from the least squares-based estimations are
not always well-behaved. The FE OLS estimation suffers from residual non-normality,
as indicated by the p-value of the Jarque-Bera (JB) test statistic.
Table 3.2: Results for One-step GMM by Type of Investment (per Trend GDP)
1-step GMM GEXP GINV 1.INF 2.HS 3.PG 4.RED
Inv(lag) 0.36889*** 0.46137*** 0.425862*** 0.51883*** 0.61116*** 0.49203***
(4.65) (4.47) (4.78) (3.94) (4.90) (4.89)
tax 0.04042 0.03342*** 0.01967*** 0.00754 0.01193** 0.00077
(0.33) (2.08) (3.36) (1.04) (2.38) (0.16)
cap 3.20978*** 0.37123*** 0.05091 0.07498*** 0.10902* 0.02656
(4.10) (2.16) (1.38) (3.11) (1.82) (0.42)
gdp -0.35307 1.27741*** 0.47619*** 0.23047 0.33452*** 0.20746**
(0.17) (3.16) (2.46) (1.41) (3.55) (2.39)
lend 0.01427 -0.00424* -0.00098 -0.00024 -0.00121 -0.00203**
(0.77) (1.54) (0.99) (0.28) (0.98) (2.09)
debt 0.01057 -0.00019 -0.00061 0.00007 0.001839** 0.00067
(0.40) (0.07) (1.06) (0.08) (2.36) (0.90)
pop 15.4208*** 0.34454*** - 0.12783 0.22029 -0.03762 0.12006
(2.44) (0.03) (0.43) (0.98) (0.08) (0.45)
Sargan 1.0000 0.6066 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
m1 0.0239 0.0617 0.0465 0.0640 0.0248 0.0349
m2 0.4547 0.3229 0.3212 0.5098 0.1196 0.8624
Obs. 121 104 104 104 102 101
One-step GMM calculated with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Sargan test for robust
one-step GMM cannot be performed. We refer to test results from two-step GMM. Results for the
constant are omitted. Note that the time trend is dropped for GMM since this procedure is based on
first differencing.
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Before considering results of types of investment in more detail, let us interpret param-
eter estimates for overall expenditure and public investment: First, differently from
the ”Leviathan hypothesis”, we observe that general expenditure does not depend on
decentralization. On the other hand, capital transfers and the lagged dependent vari-
able are highly significant. For our sample, decentralization mainly implies a shift in
revenue or spending responsibility rather than a change in overall expenditure per se.
Note that GDP does not positively affect the overall level of public expenditure. This
is probably due to the inclusion of capital transfers into the equation. However, for
consistency reasons, we do not change the model specification across estimations.
As regards estimates for general public investment (per trend GDP), it is roughly the
sum of the parameter values for investment types one to four. Parameters for the
taxshare, capital transfers, and GDP are significant. However, two exceptions do exist.
First, the parameter estimates of the lagged dependent variables do not add up over
the four types of investment. This is because the lagged dependent variable is the
only variable, which is not identical across estimations (it is the lagged value of each
of the four types of public investment per GDP). Thus, parameters are not directly
comparable. Second, the four parameter estimates for the debt variable do not add up
the debt effect in GINV. This may be due to the low significance of this variable in
most regressions.
Considering the results by type of investment in Table 3.2, we conclude that a higher
sub-national tax share increases the aggregate level of investment in Infrastructure
and Public Goods, but it has no statistically significant impact on the aggregate public
investment in Hospitals and Schools as well as Redistribution. The parameter estimates
imply that an increase in the sub-national tax share by one percentage point leads to
an increase in investment in Infrastructure of about 0.02 percentage points of GDP, or
2 percent, respectively, evaluated at sample mean.
Returning to Table 3.2 and considering the coefficient estimates for capital transfers,
we observe a significant positive impact on investment in Hospitals and Schools as
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well as Public Goods. An increase of capital transfers by 1 percent of GDP boosts
these types of investment by 0.07 and 0.11 percentage points of GDP (14 percent and
15 percent, respectively, at sample mean). As regards other control variables, real per
capita GDP is positive and significant in all four models, except of hospitals and schools
with coefficient estimates of 0.2-0.5. The fiscal variables are mostly insignificant, except
that higher budgetary surpluses reduce investment in Redistribution and that higher
public debt goes hand in hand with higher investment in Public Goods.
Economic Interpretation
Our results suggest that decentralization increases economically productive public in-
vestment, notably investment in public spillover goods (Infrastructure). There is no
statistically significant impact of decentralization on public investment in consumption-
oriented local public goods (Redistribution). Although one might have expected de-
centralization to increase Hospitals and Schools - as this could be interpreted as a
more indirect kind of public input, this is not confirmed by our results. Thus, public
Hospitals and Schools do not function as a public input here.
We saw in Section 2 how the theory of fiscal federalism could be used to derive some
hypotheses about the composition of public investment. Most notably, it suggests that
decentralized tax autonomy leads to lower provision of public consumption goods, while
the level of public inputs may either decrease or increase (see Proposition 3.1). The
impact of decentralization on our variable Public Goods was considered ambiguous,
depending on whether it is dominated by local or global public goods. In other words,
while not readily reconcilable with the traditional theory of fiscal federalism, especially
as regards the provision of local public goods, these findings can be interpreted in terms
of the literature on fiscal competition, with not only tax rates but also the quality of
public expenditure weighing in firms’ location decisions. Decentralization increases
the level of investment in Infrastructure. This is in line with our theoretical analysis,
particularly Proposition 3.1, which claims that public inputs provision may increase
with decentralization. This being the case, we do not see any evidence of decentraliza-
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tion being associated with tax competition that would have a detrimental impact on
public investment. On the other hand, we expected Redistribution to decrease with
decentralization. This parameter, however, is not significant and does therefore not
support our theoretical prediction in Proposition 3.1 as regards the provision of public
consumption goods. This may be due to the stickiness of public expenditure: Over
time public expenditure hardly decreases. But if kept constant (as Redistribution is
in our case), inflation and more pronounced expenditure in other sectors, may lead to
lower spending for this type of investment.
Note that the estimation results for total expenditure and GINV together suggest that
our tax competition argument in terms of public inputs also holds in a more general
context: total public expenditure as such is not affected by decentralization, while
public investment does increase. This implies that decentralization leads to a shift of
public expenditure towards public investment (at the cost of other, more consumption
oriented expenditure). This is also in line with other studies such as De Granado (2006)
and Arze et al. (2005).
3.4.5 Measuring Decentralization
To measure decentralization, Stegarescu (2005) also accounts for the autonomy of sub-
national governments to determine their tax base and/or tax rate. He argues that
federal systems are more decentralized if sub-national governments rather than central
governments can determine the tax rate or tax base - even if sub-national governments
receive the same tax share. According to this argument, the OECD (1999) proposes a
classification of taxes by decreasing order of regional control over tax revenues. This
is shown in Table 3.3.
Based on this classification of tax autonomy, Stegarescu (2005) proposed three decen-
tralization measures relative to the tax revenue of sub-national governments. We are
interested in two of them, TDec1 and TDec3, as defined in Equations 3.6 and 3.7
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Table 3.3: Classification of Taxes (in Decreasing Order of Control over Revenue
Sources)
(a) sub-central government (SCG) determines tax rate and tax base
(b) SCG determines tax rate only
(c) SCG determines tax base only
(d) tax sharing:
(d.1) SCG determines revenue-split
(d.2) revenue-split only changed with consent of SCG
(d.3) revenue-split unilaterally changed by centr. gov. (CG) (legislation)
(d.4) revenue-split unilaterally changed by CG (annual budget)
(e) CG determines tax rate and tax base
Source: OECD (1999).
TDec1 =
SCG own tax rev. (a) to (c)
GG total tax rev.
(3.6)
This index only considers regional tax revenues if the tax base and/or tax rate are
independently determined by the regional government. Stegarescu also proposes a
more general form of this index to measure decentralization:
TDec3 =
SCG own tax rev. (a) to (e)
GG total tax rev.
(3.7)
This measure is closer to the taxshare used so far in this paper, since it relaxes the
condition on local tax revenue to be taken into consideration. TDec3 accounts for all
seven categories of tax revenue.
The decentralization measure, which we do not consider includes tax revenues of type
a to c as well as d2 (This is labeled TDec2 in Stegarescu (2005)). Summary statistics
in Table A1.1 show that the statistical properties of decentralization measures TDec1
and TDec3 are very similar for our sample. A further distinction among categories as
suggested for TDec2 does not lead to further insights in our case.
Re-estimating our model by using TDec1 instead of the taxshare yields the following
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results:
Table 3.4: Results Using Decentralization Measure tDec1
1-step GMM 1.INF 2.HS 3.PG 4.RED
Inv(lag) 0.45033*** 0.51164*** 0.64227*** 0.51713***
(4.37) (4.10) (6.21) (4.82)
TDec1 0.01944** 0.01093 0.01598*** 0.00264
(2.35) (1.44) (2.90) (0.49)
cap 0.05568* 0.07261*** 0.08878* 0.01402
(1.75) (2.87) (1.87) (0.23)
gdp 0.51547** 0.33063** 0.45739*** 0.21523**
(2.52) (2.12) (5.22) (2.06)
lend -0.00076 -0.00006 -0.00119 -0.00189**
(0.77) (0.07) (1.01) (1.99)
debt -0.00008 0.00047 0.00214** 0.00060
(0.13) (0.43) (2.03) (0.82)
pop 0.11729 0.31289 0.10848 0.14465
(0.37) (1.49) (0.24) (0.50)
Sargan 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
m1 0.0511 0.0588 0.0227 0.0287
m2 0.3053 0.7376 0.11074 0.9733
Obs. 105 105 103 102
One-step GMM calculated with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Sargan test for robust
one-step GMM cannot be performed. Test results from two-step GMM. Results for constant are
omitted.
Substituting TDec1 by TDec3 yields the results in Table 3.5.
It turns out that the significance in general (and for decentralization in particular)
follows the same pattern as in Table 3.2, though slightly decreasing for TDec3. TDec1
as well as TDec3 is significant for investment types 1 and 3, whereas parameter esti-
mates for investment types 2 and 4 are not. Thus, the measures of decentralization as
proposed by Stegarescu (2005) also confirm that decentralization leads to more invest-
ment in public infrastructure, which is the most evident public input among the four
categories. This is in line with the theoretical findings in Section 3.2 that decentraliza-
tion leads to strategic competition for private capital through increased public input
provision.
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Table 3.5: Results Using Decentralization Measure tDec3
1-step GMM 1.INF 2.HS 3.PG 4.RED
Inv(lag) 0.47685*** 0.49618*** 0.62314*** 0.51602***
(4.85) (4.10) (5.56) (4.83)
TDec3 0.01332* 0.01050 0.01468*** 0.00308
(1.73) (1.52) (3.08) (0.59)
cap 0.06357** 0.07201*** 0.09452** 0.01300
(2.03) (2.91) (2.03) (0.22)
gdp 0.38175** 0.29501** 0.39640*** 0.22499***
(2.05) (2.40) (4.97) (2.62)
lend -0.00058 -0.00014 -0.00129 -0.00200**
(0.66) (0.16) (1.02) (2.03)
debt -0.00043 0.00013 0.00171* 0.00066
(0.65) (0.14) (1.86) (0.89)
pop 0.00420 0.31694* 0.71817 0.13854
(0.01) (1.65) (0.16) (0.52)
Sargan 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
m1 0.0538 0.0577 0.0271 0.02715
m2 0.2688 0.6030 0.1073 0.8852
Obs. 105 105 103 102
One-step GMM calculated with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Sargan test for robust
one-step GMM cannot be performed. Test results from two-step GMM. Results for constant are
omitted.
3.4.6 Identifying Regional Autonomy
There is a further problem with our definition of decentralization. On may argue that
decentralization also leads to tax competition among regions. This reasoning implies
that tax revenues decline with more decentralization - and as a result also overall public
investment (including Infrastructure). Our estimation would still yield a significantly
positive decentralization parameter, although the actual effect was reversed.
Indeed, it is local autonomy, in what we are interested. If regions are more autonomous,
we argue that they will use this autonomy to compete for private capital by increasing
investment in Infrastructure. One way to evade the problem with tax competition is
therefore to only concentrate on additional regional funds, which are controlled by the
national government. If, e.g. tax revenue is levied by the central government and trans-
ferred to regions, they have no means to compete in tax rates. If these centrally levied
funds still increase public infrastructure, we confirm that public input competition is
the driving force in our setting (as suggested). Therefore, concentrating on spending
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autonomy allows identifying the competition aspect related to public inputs. Given
the definition of decentralization as in Table 3.3, we therefore re-estimate our model
by measuring decentralization through centrally controlled taxes, only. This comprises
items (d) to (e) in Table 3.3.
Table 3.6: Results for Regional Autonomy (Categories (d) to (e))
1-step GMM 1.INF 2.HS 3.PG 4.RED
Inv(lag) 0.59324*** 0.56097*** 0.69880*** 0.52785***
(4.99) (5.06) (7.82) (5.34)
autonomy 0.03021*** -0.00370 0.00524 -0.00886
(2.98) (0.31) (0.78) (1.27)
cap 0.08652*** 0.08807*** 0.09638** 0.02155
(2.81) (3.17) (2.20) (0.39)
gdp 0.26896* 0.12164 0.17302* 0.17956
(1.81) (0.86) (1.81) (1.57)
lend 0.00047 -0.00005 -0.00059 -0.00207**
(0.33) (0.07) (0.56) (2.16)
debt 0.00058 0.00000 0.00132 -0.00055
(0.61) (0.01) (1.55) (0.67)
pop -0.23167 0.09492 -0.15547 0.05104
(1.39) (0.51) (0.36) (0.22)
Sargan 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
m1 0.0418 0.0572 0.0298 0.0212
m2 0.2411 0.3739 0.0868 0.7293
Obs. 105 105 103 102
One-step GMM calculated with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Sargan test for robust one-
step GMM cannot be performed. We refer to test results from two-step GMM. Results for constant
are omitted.
As before, the decentralization parameter is significant for Infrastructure investment.
This suggests that if more funds are transferred from the central government towards its
regions (which may be interpreted as higher spending autonomy at the regional level),
regions use these additional funds to increase their public infrastructure spending.
This finding supports the view of Keen and Marchand (1997): They argue that regional
competition (higher autonomy) leads to increased investment into public inputs relative
to public consumption. Interestingly, the new decentralization measure has no longer
an positive impact on Public Goods. Thus, this additional robustness check is even
more in favor of our hypothesis in Proposition 3.1, which concerns Infrastructure and
Recreation, only.
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3.4.7 Results for Aggregated Types of Investment
In order to directly refer to the theoretical findings in Section 3.2, we re-estimate the
model by aggregating types of investment: Investment of type one and two is aggregated
and labeled public input. Similarly we label the sum of public investment of type 3
and 4 as public consumption. Estimating the 1-step GMM model for theses two types
of investment leads to the following results:
Table 3.7: Results, Public Inputs vs. Public Consumption Goods
1-step GMM INPUT CONSUMPTION
Inv(lag) 0.38411*** 0.47162***
(5.67) (3.66)
tax 0.03324*** 0.0069
(4.50) (1.23)
cap 0.12204* 0.19768***
(1.81) (2.26)
gdp 0.81818*** 0.56898***
(3.45) (5.38)
lend -0.00196 -0.00348*
(1.15) (1.71)
debt -0.00144 0.00068
(1.18) (0.67)
pop 0.54318* 0.11267
(1.74) (0.17)
Sargan 1.0000 1.0000
m1 0.0462 0.0241
m2 0.3398 0.7701
Obs. 104 104
One-step GMM calculated with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Sargan test for robust
one-step GMM cannot be performed. We refer to test results from two-step GMM. Results for the
constant are omitted.
Again, the results confirm the theoretical findings in Section 3.2 as regards public input
provision. The tax share variable is significant at the 1 percent level only for public
inputs, whereas it is insignificant for public consumption goods. This result directly
replicates our theoretical finding from Proposition 3.1.12 Decentralization leads to
more competition among regions. In order to attract private capital, they invest more
into public inputs. This raises the overall level of Infrastructure Investment in the
12The only difference is again that we distinguish among different types of investment, while the
standard literature refers to public expenditure.
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economy. On the other hand, public investment classified as Public Consumption
remains unchanged.
3.4.8 External vs. Internal Competition
So far, we assumed that regional competition for private capital leads to higher over-
all investment in public inputs. However, given the structure of our data, it is not
clear, whether this effect does not also depend on competition at the national level
(among EU-countries rather than regions). E.g. Devereux and Griffith (1998) and
Devereux and Freeman (1995) argue that competition for private capital indeed does
occur among EU countries. Benassy-Quere et all (2005) also show that in this context
input competition arises. So far we did not consider this aspect in our analysis. Our
results might therefore suffer from an omitted variable bias. In the following we in-
troduce a measure to account for inter-state competition. Thereby we account for the
fact that some countries within the EU may be subject to fiercer external competition
than others. This, of course, may also have an impact on the composition of public
investment. In particular, Foreign Direct Investment is a good measure for the inter-
action of one economy with other countries. Therefore, we add to our analysis the sum
of inward and outward FDI-stocks per GDP as additional explanatory variable. For
better comparison, we refer again to the tax share as decentralization measure.
FDI stocks are mainly a measure for the long-term interaction among countries. How-
ever, one might argue that short-term variations are more likely to affect the composi-
tion of public investment. In order to capture also these short run variations, we also
present results for an FDI index including inflows and outflows per GDP in Table 3.9.
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Table 3.8: Results Including FDI-Stocks (Stock of Inflows and Outflows, EU15)
1-step GMM 1.INF 2.HS 3.PG 4.RED
Inv(lag) 0.48364*** 0.57731*** 0.52782*** 0.42669***
(5.67) (4.79) (4.90) (3.16)
tax 0.01440*** 0.00546 0.00729* 0.00073
(2.72) (1.11) (1.91) (0.20)
cap 0.08402* 0.07898** 0.12913*** 0.04128
(1.95) (2.55) (2.89) (0.60)
gdp 0.40320* 0.23424* 0.23918** 0.28992
(1.86) (1.66) (2.41) (1.63)
lend 0.00007 0.00147** 0.00050 -0.00236***
(0.07) (1.24) (0.55) (3.90)
debt -0.00033 -0.00000 -0.00074 -0.00051
(0.29) (0.00) (0.71) (0.32)
pop -0.06791 0.24900 -0.20590 0.20738
(0.24) (1.18) (0.51) (0.75)
FDI-stock -0.04437** 0.0561 0.08142*** 0.01085
(2.22) (0.72) (4.07) (0.25)
Sargan 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
m1 0.0646 0.1055 0.0352 0.0449
m2 0.2901 0.4209 0.2612 0.9588
Obs. 86 86 84 83
One-step GMM calculated with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Sargan test for robust
one-step GMM cannot be performed. We refer to test results from two-step GMM. Results for the
constant are omitted.
It turns out that the basic findings regarding the impact of decentralization on the
composition of public investment do not change by considering the openness of a coun-
try (apart from lower significance of Public Goods). Therefore, we conclude that our
results are also robust towards external competition effects. However, against our in-
tuition, the FDI-stock has a negative impact on Infrastructure and a positive effect on
Public Goods, while FDI-flows are not significant for any type of public investment.
These results suggest that competition among nations has no clear-cut effect on the
composition of public investment. One possible explanation is that at this level public
input competition and tax competition occur at the same time. In this case an un-
ambiguous conclusion about which effect is significant is not possible - at least in our
specification. However, this interpretation also confirms our approach to concentrate
on regional competition, only, in order to identify public input competition (see also
Section 3.4.6)
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Table 3.9: Results Including FDI-Index (FDI Flows, In and Out, per GDP, EU15)
1-step GMM 1.INF 2.HS 3.PG 4.RED
Inv(lag) 0.43129*** 0.65296*** 0.54930*** 0.40647***
(7.28) (4.82) (5.98) (2.74)
tax 0.01558*** 0.00430 0.00555 0.00448
(2.72) (1.05) (1.28) (1.50)
cap 0.03187 0.06014* 0.15233** 0.00931
(0.70) (1.68) (2.41) (0.20)
gdp 0.17770 0.18584 0.10854 0.35270***
(0.72) (1.47) (0.95) (2.61)
lend 0.00019 -0.00005 -0.00183*** -0.00125**
(0.13) (0.06) (2.61) (1.99)
debt 0.00037 0.00022 -0.00041 -0.00102
(0.36) (0.15) (0.50) (0.62)
pop -0.18475 0.27381 0.13970 0.34492
(0.47) (1.56) (0.65) (1.13)
FDI-flow 0.00002 0.00000 0.00000 0.00003
(0.56) (0.27) (0.45) (1.36)
Sargan 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
m1 0.0946 0.0823 0.0672 0.1046
m2 0.1478 0.7339 0.1294 0.3181
Obs. 83 83 81 80
One-step GMM calculated with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Sargan test for robust
one-step GMM cannot be performed. We refer to test results from two-step GMM. Results for the
constant are omitted.
Finally, there is also a theoretical argument why omitting international competition
does not weaken our results: Assume that also national governments compete for
private capital. In this case also central governments have incentives to increase in-
vestment in Infrastructure. In line with Kappeler (2007), the national (or middle level)
and regional targets would be subject to a bias in the same direction to exploit the
supranational government. Regional decentralization would then exert a limited addi-
tional effect on the level of public inputs. Thus, if competition at the national level
is an issue, our results would constitute kind of a lower bound case: Though we only
account for local competition, our decentralization parameter for infrastructure is sig-
nificant. We may expect regional competition effect to be even larger if we separately
capture an existing competition effect at the national level.
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3.4.9 Methodological Robustness-Checks
As Bond et all (2001) suggest, for large T and small N the reliability of standard
GMM-methods may be limited due to the large number of instruments generated in
this case. To test, whether this problem is of relevance for our sample, we re-estimate
our basic model with two alternative approaches: Besides Corrected Least Squares
Dummy Variable estimates (LSDVC) as proposed by Bruno (2005), we also refer to
2SLS with only the second lag being used to instrument the lagged dependent variable.
Bond (2002) argues that GMM is generally more suitable for large N and small T . In
our case, however, T (16) is large relative to N (10). Similar to OLS, one-step GMM
in this case might be biased since the number of instruments becomes relatively large
(in our case up to 125). 2SLS allows estimating the model with a smaller number of
instruments. Thereby, we can correct for a large part of the bias (though probably
not all), while the number of instruments remains low. Therefore, we also estimate the
basic model with 2SLS with only the second lag as instrument for the lagged dependent
variable allowing for more degrees of freedom.
To properly deal with a small sample bias in dynamic econometric models, a Corrected
Least Squares Dummy Variable estimator is recently discussed in the econometric lit-
erature. Bruno (2005) proves efficiency of this estimator in case of unbalanced data
with large T and small N such as ours. The estimator can be performed in two ways
- the Anderson-Hsiao (AH) and Arrelano Bond (AB) based approaches. Judson and
Owen (1996) show in a Monte Carlo Study that for T > N and a sample size similar
to ours, the Anderson-Hsiao approach is the preferred one. Therefore, we expect the
AH-approach to be superior compared to LSDVC AB in our case. For comparison
reasons, we report results for both specifications together with 2SLS in Tables 3.10 to
3.13.
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Table 3.10: Results in Levels, Investment in Infrastructure per Trend GDP
1.INV (level) 2SLS FE LSDVC AB LSDVC AH
Inv1(lag) -0.787149 0.54962*** 0.47006***
(0.48) (6.09) (4.46)
tax 0.023841*** 0.01222** 0.01407
(3.17) (2.06) (0.07)
cap 0.08717 0.06166 0.06283
(1.63) (1.19) (0.04)
gdp 0.67749*** 0.370** 0.38334
(2.94) (1.99) (0.06)
lend -0.00470** 0.0003 0.00005
(2.02) (0.20) (0.00)
debt -0.00323** 0.00019 -0.00027
(2.03) (0.16) (0.01)
pop 0.07607 -0.08348 -0.02325
(0.21) (0.25) (0.00)
R2-Adj 0.3333
Sargan 0.2861
m1 0.0389
m2 0.2021
Obs. 111 104 104
GLS cross section weights used. Instrument used for 2SLS is the second lag of the dependent vari-
able. For LSDVC, bias correction up to order O(1/T ); boostrap variance-covariance matrix with 100
iterations.
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Table 3.11: Results in Levels, Investment in Hospitals and Schools per Trend GDP
2.HS (level) 2SLS FE LSDVC AB LSDVC AH
Inv2(lag) 0.22737* 0.63470*** 0.69218***
(1.67) (7.74) (7.46)
tax 0.00983* 0.00482 0.00352
(1.89) (1.03) (0.52)
cap 0.09906*** 0.07822* 0.07039
(2.74) (1.93) (1.38)
gdp 0.27753* 0.23013 0.24561
(1.84) (1.58) (1.27)
lend 0.00004 -0.00055 -0.00072
(0.03) (0.53) (0.54)
debt 0.00021 0.00074 0.00055
(0.24) (0.84) (0.48)
pop 0.62487** 0.20319 0.16069
(2.25) (0.71) (0.44)
R2-Adj 0.4655
Sargan 0.9542
m1 0.0052
m2 0.5355
Obs. 111 104 104
GLS cross section weights used. Instrument used for 2SLS is the second lag of the dependent vari-
able. For LSDVC, bias correction up to order O(1/T ); boostrap variance-covariance matrix with 100
iterations.
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Table 3.12: Results in Levels, Investment in Public Goods per Trend GDP
3.PG (level) 2SLS FE LSDVC AB LSDVC AH
Inv3(lag) 0.38665*** 0.65266*** 0.56929***
(3.07) (5.58) (4.94)
tax 0.00817 0.00628 0.0107
(1.44) (0.97) (1.07)
cap 0.15717*** 0.10543** 0.09517
(3.01) (2.07) (1.31)
gdp 0.22465 0.21320 0.26253
(1.34) (1.28) (1.05)
lend 0.00022 -0.00045 -0.00021
(0.14) (0.29) (0.09)
debt 0.00122 0.00091 0.00092
(1.20) (0.80) (0.57)
pop 0.17937 0.04649 -0.08657
(0.64) (0.13) (0.17)
R2-Adj 0.5770
Sargan 0.3576
m1 0.7438
m2 0.8014
Obs. 109 102 102
GLS cross section weights used. Instrument for 2SLS is second lag of the dependent variable. For
LSDVC, bias correction up to order O(1/T ); boostrap variance-covariance matrix with 100 iterations.
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Table 3.13: Results in Levels, Investment in Redistribution per Trend GDP
4.RED (level) 2SLS FE LSDVC AB LSDVC AH
Inv4(lag) 0.43572*** .54735*** .46214***
(3.27) (5.71) (4.03)
tax -0.00013 0.00084 0.00123
(0.03) (0.16) (0.14)
cap 0.05590 0.05183 0.05221
(1.43) (1.45) (0.85)
gdp 0.22701 0.23844* 0.25135
(1.59) (1.71) (1.02)
lend -0.00168 -0.00157 -0.00179
(1.32) (1.39) (0.91)
debt -0.00031 -0.00000 -0.00035
(0.38) (0.01) (0.23)
pop 0.10678 0.12188 0.14232
(0.48) (0.49) (0.32)
R2-Adj 0.4943
Sargan 0.7139
m1 0.0010
m2 0.8878
Obs. 108 101 101
GLS cross section weights used. Instrument for 2SLS is second lag of the dependent variable. For
LSDVC, bias correction up to order O(1/T ); boostrap variance-covariance matrix with 100 iterations.
It turns out that 2SLS supports our basic estimations in Section 3.4.4: As before, the
tax variable is significant for Infrastructure, while Redistribution is unaffected by a
change in the tax share. Moreover, Hospitals and Schools are also positively affected
by decentralization, while Public Goods are not. Thus, 2SLS speaks even more in favor
of our theoretical hypothesis on input competition than 1-step GMM does. The results
suggest that the potential bias of 1-step GMM for our sample is likely to be small.
In order to further verify the reliability of 1-step GMM with our data, we also use
LSDVC. However, the different specifications of LSDVC do not provide a clear picture:
The Sargan test and Arrelano-Bond autocorrelation tests for first-stage regressions do
not reject LSDVC AB. Therefore, we conclude that this estimator is consistent. Indeed,
the results are in line with our findings in Section 3.4.4 in terms of significance and
parameter values - particularly for our decentralization variable. The only difference
occurs for investment of type 3: Its decentralization parameter is not significant. This
supports our robustness checks in Sections 3.4.5 to 3.4.8. Thus, overall AB LSDVC is
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in line with our hypothesis that regions compete in public inputs for private capital
and suggests that the bias underlying the GMM and FE OLS results does not drive
our results.
As mentioned, in theory the LSDVC approach based on Anderson-Hsiao (AH) outper-
forms the GMM based LSDVC estimator (AB) for N and T as in our sample (again,
see Judson and Owen (1996)). Therefore, we also present AH-LSDVC results in Tables
3.10 to 3.13. It becomes evident that all variables apart from the lagged dependent
are insignificant. This puts doubts on whether these results should be interpreted in
our case. In particular, it seems puzzling that neither GDP nor conditional capital
transfers do affect any of the four types of public investment. We would expect at least
some of them to be positively correlated with either GDP or conditional transfers.
The reason for the weak performance of AH LSDVC is likely to be due to the high
level of aggregation of our data and the structural inbalancedness of our sample (there
are few years missing for most countries, whereas for other years the sample is com-
plete). Given the discrepancy between the empirical superiority of LSDVC AB (which
is accepted by statistical tests) and the theoretical superiority of AH (but its overall
insignificance), LSDVC serves as a robustness check rather than our basic regression
methodology.
3.5 Conclusion
The analysis of the relationship between fiscal decentralization and the composition of
public investment is first-of-a-kind, at least in the European context. It yields some
interesting insights, most notably that fiscal decentralization seems to boost economi-
cally productive public investment and to curb the relative share of economically less
productive public investment.
While not readily reconcilable with the traditional theory of fiscal federalism, especially
as regards the provision of local public goods, these findings can be interpreted in
terms of the literature on fiscal competition, with not only tax rates but also the
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quality of public expenditure weighing in firms’ location decisions. The finding that
decentralization reduces the relative share of Redistribution investment can also signal
over-investment in more centralized system with competition for a common pool of
resources.
Several robustness checks are conducted to verify model specification and econometric
approach: Redefining our measure of decentralization did not affect our result that
public inputs increase in decentralization. Also, regrouping types of public investment
as well as the inclusion of external competition in the analysis confirm our findings.
In terms of methodological robustness checks, Two Stage Least Squares and Corrected
Least Squares Dummy Variable estimators suggest that the potential bias of 1-step
GMM estimators with macro data is unlikely to drive our results.
Clearly, this is but a first step in the analysis of the composition of public investment.
There is plenty of scope for future research to tackle issues that our analysis leaves
open. The theoretical foundations for studying the composition of public investment
remain thin, especially as regards the articulation of an explicit link between fiscal
federalism and different types of investment. Empirical examination of different types
of public investment could usefully focus on differences in their productivity, as well
as on a more nuanced examination of what drives the different types of investment,
including but not limited to fiscal federalism.
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3.6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1:
Proof by comparing first best provision with the non-cooperative equilibrium:
First Best (T > 0 and τ = 0):
FOC wrt. T :
−VX + VG = 0.
Thus, VG
VX
= 1, this implies first best provision of G.
FOC wrt. P:
VX · (FP + FK ·KP − (r + τ) ·KP ) + VG · (τ ·KP − 1) = 0.
Thus, FP =
VG
VX
(1− τ ·KP ).
This implies FP = 1 since τ = 0 and T > 0 in the first best and −VX + VG = 0 by
FOC wrt. T .
Non-cooperative equilibrium (T = 0 and τ > 0):
FOC wrt. τ :
VX · (FK ·Kτ −K − (r + τ) ·Kτ ) + VG · (K + τ ·Kτ ) = −VX ·K + VG · (K + τ ·Kτ ) =
−VX ·K + VG ·K(1 + τ ·KτK ) = 0 (using r + τ = FK).
Thus, VG
VX
= K
K(1+ τ ·KτK )
> 1. This implies under-provision of G compared to the first
best.
FOC wrt. P:
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VX · (FP + FK ·KP − (r + τ) ·KP ) + VG · (τ ·K ′P − 1) = 0.
From this,
FP =
VG·(1−τ ·KP )
VX
= (1−τ ·KP )
1+ τ ·Kτ
K
.
Two effects are responsible for the deviation from first best (FP = 1): −τ · KP is
the public input effect, which positively affects the provision of P . τ ·Kτ
K
is the tax
competition effect, which has a negative impact on the provision of P . It is no longer
clear, whether P is over- or under-provided relative to the first best.

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Proof of Proposition 3.2:
The proof consists of two steps. First determine FP and
VG
VX
for the non-cooperative
equilibrium. Second, substitute these results in Equation (3.2). Thereby, one can show
that at the optimum dV
dP
< 0:
1. Determine FP and
VG
VX
for the non-cooperative equilibrium:
L = V
(
F (P,K)− (r + τ) ·K + rK − T, (τ ·K(τ, P )− P ))
FOC wrt. P :
VX · (FP + FK ·KP − (r + τ) ·KP )+VG · (τ ·KP − 1) = VX ·FP +VG · (τ ·KP − 1) = 0
(using r + τ = FK)
FOC wrt. τ :
−VX ·K + VG · (K + τ ·Kτ ) = 0 (using r + τ = FK)
From FOC wrt. P :
FP = (1− τ ·KP ) · VGVX . From FOC wrt. τ :
VG
VX
=
(
1 + τ ·Kτ
K
)−1
> 1
for Kτ smaller zero. The marginal productivity of G is larger than that of the private
good. G is underprovided.
2. Plug FP and
VG
VX
into Equation (3.2):
dV =
(
FP − VGVX
)
VX · dP =
(
(1− τ ·KP ) · VGVX −
VG
VX
)
VX · dP
dV =
(
(1− τ ·KP )− 1)
(
1 + τ ·Kτ
K
)−1)
VX · dP
dV
dP
= −
(
τ ·K·KP
K+τ ·Kτ
)
VX < 0.
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Since we know that VG
VX
= K
K(1+ τ ·KτK )
> 1, it directly follows that K + τ ·Kτ > 0.
Thus, dV
dP
< 0 implies that rebalancing expenditure from P towards G strictly increases
utility.

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3.7 Appendix
Table 3.14: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
inv1 134 0.00766 0.00351 0.00270 0.01849
inv2 134 0.00511 0.00235 0.00127 0.01345
inv3 132 0.00596 0.00196 0.00231 0.00944
inv4 133 0.00456 0.00246 0.00142 0.01215
tax 158 0.18972 0.11003 0.02061 0.35691
tdec1 160 0.12134 0.09319 0.01739 0.30666
tdec3 160 0.16275 0.09616 0.01739 0.31339
captr 151 0.00735 0.00476 0.00130 0.02004
gdp 160 0.02173 0.00403 0.01373 0.03075
lend 157 -0.03798 0.14311 -0.90478 0.45339
debt 159 0.72395 0.28398 0.14797 1.44307
pop 160 30953.0 28077.3 4964.00 82520.0
Table 3.15: Multi-co-linearity
tax cap gdp lend debt pop
tax 1
cap -0.1664 1
gdp 0.6460 -0.1708 1
lend -0.1163 0.0847 0.2037 1
debt 0.0762 0.0305 -0.2045 -0.1421 1
pop -0.4374 0.1374 -0.3317 0.1210 0.1928 1
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Table 3.16: Unit Root Tests
Effect Test Statistic P-value Effect Test Statistic P-value
1.INF (level) ft LLC -2.8633 0.002 *** f LLC -0.6358 0.263
IPS 0.0706 0.528 IPS 0.16646 0.566
2.HS (level) ft LLC -4.472 0.000 *** f LLC -4.66191 0 ***
IPS -0.8755 0.191 IPS -2.11709 0.017 **
3.PG (level) ft LLC -3.7699 0.000 *** f LLC -3.68242 0.000 ***
IPS 0.0221 0.509 IPS -2.28425 0.011 **
4.RED (level) ft LLC -1.6212 0.053 * f LLC -3.16266 0.001 ***
IPS -0.5546 0.290 IPS -1.0984 0.136
Lend ft LLC -2.0155 0.022 * f LLC -3.98932 0.000 ***
IPS -1.2798 0.100 IPS -1.04089 0.149
Debt ft LLC -10.593 0.000 *** f LLC -0.70526 0.240
IPS -2.6409 0.004 *** IPS 0.58686 0.721
Cap ft LLC -6.4297 0.000 *** f LLC -2.80209 0.003 ***
IPS -2.6135 0.005 *** IPS -1.94034 0.026 **
Gdp ft LLC -8.8095 0.000 *** f LLC 2.14455 0.984
IPS -4.586 0.000 *** IPS 5.18343 1
Otaxshl ft LLC -2.2478 0.012 ** f LLC -0.39658 0.346
IPS -1.8406 0.033 ** IPS -0.03522 0.486
Pop ft LLC 4.96377 0.000 *** f LLC 0.42430 0.664
IPS 3.25404 0.001 *** IPS 4.39171 1.000
Tests conducted according to the lag length indicated by Akaike (AIC) information criteria. Asterisks
***, **, and * denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. f denotes
fixed effects and individual effects, denotes time trends.
Table 3.17: Q-test of Autocorrelation for Dependent Variable
AC Q-Stat Prob
1.INF 0.886 107.56 0.000
2.HS 0.844 97.511 0.000
3.PG 0.810 88.663 0.000
4.RED 0.854 99.156 0.000
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Chapter 4
Privatization and Public Social
Spending
4.1 Introduction
Privatization is often assumed to affect public revenue. However, there is only little
literature analyzing the link between privatization and the expenditure of the govern-
ment. Nevertheless, Sheshinski et all (2003) argue that one objective of privatization
programs is to free resources for allocation in other government activities - e.g. related
to social policy. It is the objective of this paper to better understand this link between
privatization and the composition of public expenditure.
In particular, we are interested in the link between privatization and the level of public
social spending. By privatization we mean a reallocation of control rights over firms
from a public towards a private decision maker. Thereby, it may also be interpreted
as transfer of risk from the public sector towards individuals being exposed to a higher
probability of becoming unemployed. Moreover, private firms may provide less social
security services than public firms do. In order to outbalance these additional risks,
individuals will adjust their demand for social protection by the government. The
suggestion that voters require the government to provide insurance is intuitive, given
that it is the government’s privatization policy that causes the higher risk. Thus, there
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are good arguments why privatization should generate higher public social spending.
Our theoretical model explains how privatization affects social public spending. Based
on Kanbur (1981) and Haskel and Szymanski (1993) we assume two sectors, a private
and a public with the risk of becoming unemployed being higher in the private sec-
tor. An exogenously given increase of privatization then leads to a higher expected
rate of unemployment, and at the same time higher productivity. We investigate how
privatization affects the per capita transfer as well as overall redistribution if transfers
are financed only through the profits of the public firms or through public profits and
a lump-sum tax. Our results suggest that overall redistribution is likely to increase
with privatization while per capita transfers decrease if redistribution is financed only
through profits of public firms. On the other hand, if lump-sum taxes are available to
finance redistribution, overall as well as per capita redistribution increase with privati-
zation. Finally, if it is costly to raise public funds - a commonly accepted characteristic
in the literature on public finance - additional distortions arise: The higher need for re-
distribution (and thereby higher excess burden) leads to additional inefficiencies, which
partly offset the productivity gains from privatization.
Although, an empirical analysis of the positive link between privatization and social
public expenditure goes beyond the scope of this paper, we provide some data to
emphasize our reasoning. We present data on the 31 provinces of China - one of
the most dynamic countries in terms of privatization in recent years. Figure 4.1 shows
the development of privatization, measured as the share of self- and privately employed
individuals over the total number of employees for large cities1, for the rather developed
Eastern Provinces, and for the mostly rural Western Provinces:
The share of employees in the private sector steadily increased from 1996 to 2006. This
tendency is most pronounced in urban areas, where privatization increased from 9%
to 42%. Although, the development is less pronounced in Eastern (10% to 17%) and
Western provinces (5% to 12%) they still follow a clear upward trend. As expected,
the level of privatization in the more developed Eastern Provinces is constantly above
the level of the more rural Western Provinces. Although huge variation exists among
1Cities with provincial status in China include Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin
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Figure 4.1: Private Sector Employees and Self-Employed as Share of Total, by Type
of Province, 1996-2006
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Source: Statistical Office of China, own calculations.
provinces in China, the data suggests that the privatization process is rather dynamic
throughout the country.
In contrast, Figure 4.2 shows the development of public social expenditure by category
as share of overall public expenditure. Figure 4.2 presents social public expenditure by
category as defined by the OECD (2007) upon availability of data.2
Figure 4.2: Social Public Expenditure by Category as Share of Total, Province Av-
erage, 1996-2006
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It becomes evident that also the composition of public expenditure throughout this
2The OECD categorizes social spending into 9 fields. Date on some of them, such as ”family” or
”other social policy areas”, are not available for China
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period is characterized by notable changes: There is a clear upwards trend in the
development of the three social categories of public expenditure in Figure 4.2. The
share of Social Expenditure and Retirement rose from 2% to 6% and from 4% to 7.5%,
respectively. Although, the development of Welfare Expenditure (including pensions
for disabled and civil affairs) is less pronounced, it still increased by about 50% from
2 percentage points to 3 percentage points. After all, the data suggests that China
was characterized by a very dynamic development of privatization as well as an over-
proportional increase of social expenditure in the last decade.
The evidence from China is also backed by data from other countries: E.g. Erdmann
(1998) investigates the development of social spending relative to GDP in Poland,
Hungary and the Slovak Republic throughout the transformation period in the 1990s.
Indeed she finds that although GDP decreased in the years after the system transfor-
mation, social spending as share of GDP increased for all three countries. Note as that
in the case of China, these findings are unable to prove a direct link between privatiza-
tion and social public spending. Though, the data does provide evidence to motivate
the theoretical arguments that we develop below.
The paper is organized as follows. After a short literature review in Section 4.2, Section
4.3 presents a theoretical model to identify the positive link between privatization and
social expenditure by the government. In Section 4.4 we analyze the link between
privatization and redistribution if transfers are only financed through profits of public
firms. In Section 4.5 we extend this setting by introducing lump-sum taxes on workers
to finance redistribution. Section 4.6 also accounts for the potential costs of taxation
in order to finance redistribution. Finally, Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Literature Review
While some macro-implications of privatization are still obscure as outlined by Sheshin-
ski et al. (2003), other aspects have already been discussed in more detail: E.g. several
authors looked at the link between privatization and overall economic growth: Bar-
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nett (2000) finds a significantly positive link, in particular for non-transition countries.
He also shows that privatization goes hand in hand with fiscal consolidation. This is
also confirmed by Jeronimo et al. (2000) testing this relationship with data on four
southern states in the US from 1990 to 1997.
However, there is hardly any literature on the link of privatization and the composition
of public expenditure. The starting point for our theoretical model is an hypothesis
developed by Grossman and Hart (1983) and Laffont and Tirole (1993). They show
how the relationship between principals and agents changes with privatization due to a
risk transfer from the public towards the private sector. In this context, Kanbur (1981)
proposes a model with two sectors, employees and entrepreneurs, where the latter face
the risk of failing with their business. This allows him to determine the optimal share
of workers in each sector. In a broader sense this setting could be interpreted in terms
of privatization, with a higher risk of becoming unemployed in the private sector. How-
ever, with this interpretation, the basic idea of Kanbur (1981) that individuals in one
sector (entrepreneurs) employ workers from the other sector (employees) is problematic.
This brings us closer to Haskel and Szymanski (1993). They assume a private and a
public production sector, with privatization changing the objective of a firm away from
social aspects towards more profit orientation. This implies that employment declines
with privatization. They also analyze the implications of privatization for wages; and
identify a negative link. Their theoretical findings are also supported by the empirical
evidence they provide for a sample of 14 firms in the UK.
The negative effect between privatization and employment is not without controversy.
E.g. Brown et al. (2005) find that there is a positive - though small- employment
effect of privatization due to its potential positive effect on efficiency. Aghion and
Blanchard (1993) show that depending on the level of unemployment privatization
may lead to more or less jobs. Balla et al. (2004) extend this setting by distinguishing
between skilled and unskilled labor. For our approach, this latter finding implies that
a higher need for redistribution can be motivated by arguments going beyond the
overall unemployment rate. Indeed, unemployment among unskilled workers is likely
to increase, even if privatization leads to notable efficiency gains. Balla et al. (2004)
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propose a subsidy towards unskilled workers to smooth this effect. However, their
inter-temporal setting does not concentrate on public expenditure in the first place -
as we do - but mainly focus on the labor market implications of privatization.
The idea that a certain policy measure implies additional risks for individuals and hence
should be accompanied by social measures has already been discussed in other contexts:
E.g. Rodrik (1998) claims that the size of government is larger in open economies,
because the associated risk for individuals becomes larger through more interactions
with other economies. Kreider (2003) shows how income uncertainty - which may be
related to the risk of becoming unemployed - affects redistribution. He shows that the
degree of risk aversion is an important variable to explain the relationship between
uncertainty and redistribution.
4.3 Model
Based on Haskel and Szymanski (1993) and Kanbur (1981) we set up a two sector model
- with a private and a public sector. While we assume full employment in the public
sector, the deterministic probability of becoming unemployed in the private sector is
strictly larger zero. This is a simplified representation of the higher propensity of the
state for full employment.3 Assuming a deterministic rate of unemployment in order
to simplify the labor market and thereby receive explicit solutions for other variables
of interest (in our case redistribution) is a common feature in public economic theory.
Good examples are Kreider (2003) or Boycko et al. (1996).
We assume a productivity parameter of labor being larger in the private than in the
public sector, γpriv > γpub. This assumption is in line with the common belief that
profit oriented, private firms are generally more efficient and productive. Higher pro-
ductivity in the private sector is the justification, why the state should be interested in
3For instance, Haskel and Szymanski (1993) introduce a deterministic propensity of the public
sector for high employment by introducing a variable A, which is strictly larger in the public sector.
Our approach is similar in the sense that we assume a higher preference for employment in the public
sector. However, for simplicity we don’t introduce a complete labor market, but instead assume the
unemployment rate in the private sector to be deterministic.
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privatization in our model. The overall labor force in the economy is normalized to 1
with ρ being the share of labor employed by private firms. The government maximizes
utilitarian welfare and engages in redistribution from workers towards unemployed in-
dividuals.
4.3.1 Firms
Firms only use labor as input in the production process. For simplicity we assume a
linear production technology. With prices normalized to one, the profit of a private
sector firm writes
pipriv = ρ · (γpriv − w) = 0 (4.1)
w is the wage rate in the private sector. Given the linear production function, profits in
the private sector are defined as the difference between marginal productivity and wage
rate times the number of employees. However, in line with the assumptions for perfect
competition (large number of firms) in the product market, w = γpriv throughout
the paper. Wages in the private sector correspond to the marginal productivity of
this sector; private profits are consequently equal to zero. In order to simplify our
calculations, the labor market in our model is incomplete. We assume a deterministic
unemployment rate in the private sector as explained above. This is also the reason,
why wages can not adjust to eliminate unemployment. The idea is to capture in
a simple manner the assumption that privatization leads to higher unemployment.4
Similarly, profits in the public sector are defined as
pipub = (1− ρ) · (γpub − v) (4.2)
with v as the wage rate in the public sector. The profit function of the public sector
resembles that of the private sector. There is, however, one important difference: For
4.e.g. see Haskel and Szymanski (1993) for a theoretical analysis as well as an empirical verification
of this hypothesis.
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the public sector, we do not impose any restrictions on the value of v a priori: The
public sector can, but must not pay wages equal to the marginal productivity of labor
- even under perfect competition. This holds since the government can outbalance
positive or negative profits of public firms through its budget as it is also proposed in
Shleifer and Vishny (1994). Indeed, it is often argued that public firms make losses due
to excess employment or higher public wages, which then enter the budget constraint
of the government. This is also the case in our setting, as we will see below.
4.3.2 Households
We distinguish among households assigned to the public and private sector, respec-
tively. Public employees do not face any risk of becoming unemployed. On the con-
trary, households in the private sector are exposed to unemployment with probability
(1− p). Correspondingly, p is the probability of being employed once an individual is
assigned to the private sector. Together with our assumptions from above, our model
implies a deterministic unemployment rate of ρ · (1− p).
We define preferences for each individual as a function V , with V ′ > 0 and V ′′ < 0,
depending on net-income, only. The concavity of the utility function introduces a
preference of the government for equity.5 Preferences in the public sector write
V (Cpub) = V (v)
Correspondingly, the expected utility in the private sector is
V (Cpriv) = p · V (w) + (1− p) · V (b)
b is the per capita unemployment benefit provided by the government towards unem-
ployed individuals. We assume that p · w = p · γpriv > γpub. Thus, the expected wage
of an individual in the private sector is larger than its deterministic efficiency in the
5For the moment no income tax does exist. This assumption will be relaxed later on.
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public sector. Or, to put it differently, privatization leads to an overall increase in
expected income since the expected productivity of an employee in the private sector
exceeds the productivity in the public sector.6
4.3.3 State Sector
The state maximizes utilitarian welfare with respect to the individual unemployment
benefit, b, subject to its budget constraint. In the following we assume a logarithmic
utility function for all individuals - a functional form satisfying the concavity conditions
from above. The utilitarian welfare function reads
W = (1− ρ) · ln (v) + ρ · (p · ln (w) + (1− p) · ln (b)) (4.3)
ρmay be interpreted as a measure for privatization. For the moment, the state does not
levy a lump-sum tax to finance individual unemployment benefits, b. Instead, profits of
public firms are the only source of income to finance redistribution. Consequently, the
government has no tax income to finance redistribution. This assumption is critical
for two reasons: First in most countries, redistribution is at least partly financed
by taxes on wages. Second, while the number of unemployed individuals steadily
increases with ρ, the public sector and thereby the number of contributors to the
redistribution systems shrinks. In a completely privatized economy the number of
persons financing redistribution converges to zero requiring other means to finance
redistribution. Usually, unemployment benefits are at least partly financed through
income taxes. For the moment, we concentrate on public profits in order to isolate
the link between the public budget and privatization and how it affects the utility of
individuals in the public and private sector. Section 4.5 will relax this assumption
and introduce taxes to co-finance unemployment benefits. In the present setting, the
6This assumption is a lower bound for γpriv > γpub.
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budget constraint of the state writes:
(1− ρ) · (γpub − v) = ρ · (1− p) · b (4.4)
Thus, the profits in the public sector equal its social expenditure for redistribution.
This implies that in the case of positive redistribution transfers b, γpub > v must hold.
Since w = γpriv > γpub, the wage paid in the public sector must therefore be well below
the wage in the private sector.7
The public budget constraint unambiguously determines the wage rate in the public
sector:
v = γpub − ρ
1− ρ · (1− p) · b. (4.5)
It increases in γpub and p, and decreases in b and ρ: If the marginal productivity in
the public sector γpub increases, we can see from Equation (4.2) that the public firm’s
balance increases and therefore the public sector has more funds available. This allows
for higher public wages. On the other hand, a higher level of per capita redistribution
b requires more public spending. The only way to finance b is to reduce wages in the
public sector. Moreover, v decreases in ρ: More privatization yields higher expected
unemployment and therefore a higher need of public funds, which can only be generated
through a reduction in v. Note also that a higher probability of employment p in the
private sector reduces the need for redistribution. The production of public firms can
then be used to a larger extent for compensating its employees; v increases.
7This result contrasts the findings in Haskel and Szymanski (1993). They determine a wage rate
being higher in the public than in the private sector. However, their finding does not account for
higher efficiency in the private sector or the financing of redistribution through public profits as we
do. Instead, what drives their results is the distinction between different welfare weights for unions
and consumer surplus, respectively.
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4.4 Result without Lump-Sum Tax
The government redistributes from workers towards unemployed individuals, which is
welfare improving due to its utilitarian welfare objective and the concavity of con-
sumers’ preferences. To asses the optimal per capita unemployment transfer, the gov-
ernment maximizes Equation (4.3) wrt. b subject to its budget constraint in Equation
(4.4). This yields the following first order condition:
∂W
∂b
= (1− ρ) · 1
v
· ∂v
∂b
+ ρ · (1− p) · 1
b
= 0
It states that the negative impact of a higher b on public wages (first term) needs
to be exactly outbalanced by the benefits of a larger b for the unemployed (second
term). Since we deal with utilitarian welfare, the two opposing effects are weighted
by the marginal utility times the number of persons concerned. Solving for b yields
Proposition 4.1.
Proposition 4.1:
i) The optimal redistribution rate is characterized by b = γpub · 1−ρ1−ρ·p .
ii) Higher privatization implies a decrease in the optimal redistribution rate b and an
increase in overall redistribution (b · ρ · (1− p)) if and only if p > 2·ρ−1
ρ2
.
iii) Redistribution from public workers to unemployed individuals is perfect, in partic-
ular w > v = b.
Proof see Appendix 4.8. .
The optimal redistribution rate depends on ρ, γpub, and p: As expected, b increases in
γpub. Higher productivity in the public sector makes more public funds available, which
can be distributed among public workers and unemployed. Intuitively, b also increases
in p: A higher probability of being employed in the private sector requires less overall
redistribution. The reduced overall requirement for public spending is then transferred
partly to workers in the public sector through higher wages and partly to unemployed
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through higher per-capita transfers in order to equalize marginal utilities.
The second part of Proposition 4.1 claims that privatization leads to lower per-capita
redistribution b. If public firms are privatized, more people face the exogenously given
risk of becoming unemployed, (1−p). Further, privatization leads - by definition - to a
decrease in the number of public workers (and in our case the number of contributors
to the redistribution system). If the number of expected transfer receivers increases
at the cost of the number of contributors, individual unemployment benefits need to
decrease. Otherwise, the tax burden for contributors would be too high to restore the
optimality condition for redistribution of equal marginal utilities.
Furthermore, overall redistribution, defined as per capita redistribution times the ex-
pected number of unemployed, increases with privatization if p > 2·ρ−1
ρ2
. Privatization
increases the expected number of unemployed persons, implying a higher need for
redistribution (direct effect). On the other hand, we have seen that per capita redistri-
bution transfers decrease in ρ (indirect effect): Due to the assumed utilitarian welfare
objective and the functional form of individual preferences, the government wants to
distribute the cost of additional unemployment evenly throughout the society. This has
a negative, indirect impact on overall redistribution. Which of these two effects pre-
vails depends on the parameter values of p and ρ determining the share of unemployed
individuals in the economy. To see this, Figure 4.3 displays the graph of p = 2·ρ−1
ρ2
,
that is the condition determining the sign of the derivative of overall redistribution
with respect to privatization.
In an economy with high expected unemployment (ρ high and p low) overall redistribu-
tion decreases in privatization, meaning that the indirect effect prevails: With a large
number of unemployed, the reduction in b for each transfer receiver has a larger ag-
gregate effect on redistribution than the marginal increase in transfer receivers caused
by privatization. On the other hand, if the expected unemployment rate is low (ρ low
and p high), the direct effect prevails and overall redistribution increases in privati-
zation: The number of public workers is large relative to the number of unemployed.
Therefore, most of the cost of additional unemployment will be financed through lower
public wages rather than the reduction in b. Privatization leads then to an increase in
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Figure 4.3: Sign of Derivative of Overall Redistribution wrt. ρ
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overall redistribution. Loosely speaking, if unemployment is low, the government can
generously increase overall redistribution, since this cost is born by a relatively large
number of public workers. This is not possible if unemployment is high.
Part three of Proposition 4.1 says that while the income of private employees exceed
the income of public workers and unemployed, redistribution between public workers
and unemployed is perfect: Since the financing of redistribution through public profits
does not imply any loss whatsoever, the government can perfectly redistribute among
public workers and unemployed individuals. Thereby, it achieves its first best objective
of identical marginal utilities for these two groups. On the other hand, absent taxes,
there are no feedback effects of redistribution on private workers - they are simply not
involved in redistribution. Since private wages correspond to the higher productivity in
this sector, the utility of private workers exceeds the utility of both public workers and
unemployed individuals. Thus, the instrument to finance redistribution is incomplete
because it does not involve private workers. The government can therefore achieve its
objective to equalize marginal utilities only for two out of three consumer groups.
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4.5 Result with Lump-Sum Tax
In Section 4.4 public profits have been the only means to finance redistribution. As
we have seen this assumption is critical. In this section we therefore introduce an
additional tool to raise public funds: lump-sum taxes on public and private workers.
This enables the government to also involve private workers in financing unemployment
benefits.
With lump sum taxes on workers, the objective function of the government writes.
maxτ,bW = (1− ρ) · ln (v − τ) + ρ · (p · ln (w − τ) + (1− p) · ln (b)) (4.6)
Correspondingly, its budget constraint reads
(1− ρ) · (γpub − v) + (1− ρ+ ρ · p) · τ = ρ · (1− p) · b
Besides public profits, the lump sum tax on both public workers (1 − ρ) and private
workers (ρ · p) is available to cover social expenditure. The budget constraint unam-
biguously determines the wage rate in the public sector:
v = γ − 1
1− ρ · ((1− p) · ρ · b− (1− ρ+ ρ · p) · τ)
As before, the public wage rate decreases in b and ρ, and increases in p and in the
productivity of the public sector. New is the positive impact of τ on v: τ is an
additional instrument to finance redistribution, which (differently from public profits)
also includes private workers. Thus, while τ does put a burden on workers in the
public sector, it also implies a reduced need to generate public profits in order to cover
unemployment benefits. This latter effect has a positive impact on v, since τ assures
that the cost of redistribution is no longer covered by public workers, only. The linear
budget constraint assures that public wages increase faster than the tax rate does,
implying an overall increase in the net income of public workers. Using the budget
constraint and deriving Equation (4.6) with respect to τ and b yields the following first
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order conditions:
∂W
∂τ
= (1− ρ) · 1
v − τ ·
(
∂v
∂τ
− 1
)
+ ρ · p · 1
w − τ · (−1) = 0
and
∂W
∂b
= (1− ρ) · 1
v − τ ·
∂v
∂b
+ ρ · (1− p) · 1
b
= 0
The first order condition wrt. b is similar to the one in Section 4.4 with the only
difference that now incomes net of lump-sum taxes matter. The optimality condition
for τ requires that at the margin the positive net effect of higher lump-sum taxes for
public workers equals the negative income effect for private employees. This is again
weighted by the size and marginal utilities of the two groups. Solving for τ and b
results in
Proposition 4.2:
i) The optimal redistribution rate is characterized by b = ρ · p · w + (1 − ρ) · γpub, the
optimal lump-sum tax by τ = w − ρ · p · w − (1− ρ) · γpub.
ii) Privatization implies an increase in b and in overall redistribution (b · ρ · (1− p)).
iii) Redistribution is perfect, in particular: w − τ = v − τ = b.
Proof see Appendix 4.8. .
The optimal redistribution transfer corresponds to the weighted sum of the productivity
levels in the two sectors, with the weights corresponding to the share of workers in each
sector. Since the number of individuals is normalized to one, this is equivalent to the
per-capita productivity in the economy. γpub and now also γpriv = w have a positive
impact on the optimal choice of b.
The characteristics of the optimal τ yield some interesting insights in the functioning of
the model. First, there is a positive relation between τ and w: With a higher produc-
tivity in the private sector, it is welfare improving to shift some cost of redistribution
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towards this sector: The only way to reach this goal is to increase τ . Second, higher
productivity in the public sector has a negative impact on τ . The intuition behind this
somewhat surprising result is that higher productivity ceteris paribus increases pub-
lic profits. Thus, less funds need to be acquired through taxation to finance a given
level of redistribution. Moreover, the derivative of the optimal tax rate with respect to
privatization, ∂τ
∂ρ
= −p ·w+ γpub, is negative: Since (differently from Section 4.4) pub-
lic profits are negative, redistribution occurs also from private workers towards public
workers. In a highly privatized economy, the most productive group in the economy
is relatively large. Thus, the per capita burden of redistribution for this group can be
relaxed corresponding to a reduction in τ .
The impact of privatization on per capita redistribution is now positive contrasting the
result from Section 4.4. The interpretation is as follows: By assumption, the expected
productivity in the private sector exceeds the productivity in the public sector. This
implies that an increase in ρ leads to a higher average productivity in the economy
allowing for higher per capita transfers towards the unemployed. In Section 4.4 this
mechanism did not work. There was no means to tax workers in the more productive
sector. The number of contributors decreased one to one with privatization. This
also explains why our result from above that overall redistribution increases with pri-
vatization is more clear-cut in this section: Privatization leads to a higher expected
productivity in the economy and at the same time higher unemployment - both speak-
ing in favor of higher overall redistribution.
The government perfectly insures individuals against the risk of becoming unemployed
in the private sector by equalizing marginal utilities beyond all three states (public
and private employment as well as unemployment). Indeed, given the risk aversion
and identical utility functions of individuals in each state, the best a government can
do is to equalize the income of individuals beyond states. The government disposes
over two instruments to reach this goal (public profits and lump sum taxes). None of
them entails any additional cost. Thus the government can equalize marginal utilities
without introducing additional distortions. This is realized in two steps: First, it
sets the redistribution transfer b such that it equals net income in the private sector.
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Second, with public profits the government has a second tool to assure that the net
income in the private and public sector are equal. Since v < w and taxes are imposed in
lump-sum form on all workers, public profits must be negative. Thus, the public wage
exceeds the productivity of workers in this sector. This result contrasts the result from
Section 4.4 where public profits have been positive in order to finance redistribution.
The results in Sections 4.4 and 4.5 can be interpreted in a more policy relevant context.
First of all, privatization appears to be an important factor to understand what deter-
mines the composition of public spending. Our model suggests that privatization leads
to additional risks and thereby a higher demand for social spending of the government.
It is therefore not enough to evaluate the efficiency gains of a privatization reform
in order to assess its overall performance. Rather, it is necessary to also account for
potential shifts in the demand for public goods. While privatization implies less state
control in one respect, it leads to higher state intervention in other fields undermining
one of the most important aspects of privatization efforts. Thus, in order to properly
understand the consequences of a privatization reform, it is imperative to also under-
stand its implications for the level and composition of public spending. This finding
is particularly important for transition economies characterized by huge privatization
efforts.
4.6 Excess Burden of Taxation
As we have seen, privatization is likely to require higher social public spending and
therefore public funds. If these funds are financed through taxation, another undesired
effect may arise: Excess burden of taxation. Indeed, it is often argued that raising
one unit of public funds generates a tax burden larger than one (Laffont and Tirole
(1993)). The most immediate interpretation of this finding is a distortion through
taxation. With lump-sum taxes - as assumed throughout this chapter - such distortions
do not arise. However, with the approach by Laffont and Tirole (1993) they can be
easily implemented without loosing the mathematical simplicity that lump-sum taxes
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offer. Thus, our discussion from above is incomplete because we disregard the fact that
privatization generates an additional negative effect through its higher need for social
spending. For this purpose, we extend the model from Section 4.5 by introducing an
excess burden of taxation.
Compared to Section 4.5 the welfare function of the government remains unchanged
(see Equation (4.6)). On the other hand, the budget constraint of the government
rewrites
(1− ρ) · (γ − v) + (1− ρ+ ρ · p) · τ · (1− λ) = ρ · (1− p) · b
with λ representing the excess burden. A share λ of each unit of tax-funds raised is
omitted from the equation due to the excess burden of taxation.
Maximizing the welfare function of the government wrt. b and τ and considering its
new budget constraint yields
b =
γ · (1− ρ) + (ρ · p− (1− ρ+ ρ · p) · λ) · τ
1− ρ · p
and
τ =
w · ρ·p−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ
p·ρ − γ + 11−ρ · (1− p) · ρ · b
ρ·p−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ
p·ρ +
1−λ
1−ρ · (1− ρ+ ρ · p)− 1
.
Merging these two expressions leads to the explicit solution of the model and Proposi-
tion 4.3:
Proposition 4.3:
i) Excess burden λ leads to a decrease in b and an increase in τ .
ii) Redistribution is no longer perfect, in particular: w− τ > v− τ = b, if γ · (1− ρ) +
w · ρ · p > (1− ρ+ ρ · p) · λ.
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Proof see Appendix 4.8. .
Introducing λ notably complicates the explicit solution for b and τ . However, we do
fall back to results in Section 4.5 for λ = 0. As comparative statics show, λ implies
a decrease in b and an increase in τ : If the cost of raising one unit of additional tax
income increases, it is no longer optimal to maintain the unemployment benefits from
Section 4.5: Exploiting the advantage of lump-sum taxes (redistributing among three
instead of two consumer groups) now entails an excess burden. The government wants
to evenly distribute this cost among all three groups of consumers. The only way to
reach this goal is to increase the tax rate for tax payers (that is the workers in the
private and the public sector) and at the same time reduce the redistribution rate b.
The reduction in b assures that also unemployed individuals participate in financing
the additional cost of taxation.
This has considerable consequences for the overall level of utility of each of the three
groups of consumers. Evidently, the utility must decreases for all three groups if τ
increases and b decreases as described above. However, a-priori it is not clear, whether
utility levels are still equal as in Section 4.5 or not. To address this issue, note that
the marginal cost of raising one unit of redistributions funds is larger than one due
to λ. Therefore, the government will no longer redistribute until complete equity is
restored. At one point the difference in marginal utilities will be lower than the cost of
redistribution, λ. The government will choose redistribution below first best implying
a net income for private workers above the transfer towards unemployed: w − τ > b.
Moreover, financing redistribution through public profits allows evading the additional
cost of taxation. At the margin it is profitable to reduce public wages slightly in order to
forgo λ. This implies that differently from Section 4.5, v < w.8 Note that public profits
introduce another form of inequality since it excludes private workers from financing
unemployment benefits. Therefore, a τ strictly larger zero is still desirable. Since this
does not affect the optimal redistribution between unemployed individuals and public
8Note that v < w holds for γ · (1− ρ) +w · ρ · p > (1− ρ+ ρ · p) ·w · λ. This implies that the excess
burden must be small enough. In particular this condition says that the actual production needs to
exceed the maximal possible excess burden in the economy. Indeed, we have seen in Section 4.5 that
v increases in τ and we know that a large λ requires high taxes.
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workers, the government implements identical utility levels for both unemployed and
public workers similar to Section 4.4. In consequence, net wages in the public sector
equal redistribution transfers. Thus, overall, w − τ > v − τ = b. This result is due to
the fact that more general instrument to finance redistribution (τ) implies additional
costs, whereas the instrument to redistribute between public workers and unemployed
(public profits) does not.
The findings in this section allow for interesting policy insights. Privatization may
lead to further, indirect distortions: If privatizations increases the need for public so-
cial funds, the well known excess burden of taxation may increase and at least partly
offset the efficiency gains generated by privatization: Although privatization may lead
to higher overall productivity in the economy, it also requires additional redistribu-
tion as this paper shows. Additional redistribution, however, may be costly and offset
some of the gains from privatization. Thus, in order to correctly evaluate a privatiza-
tion policy, potential indirect (and undesired) effects need to be taken into account.
Thinking further, one could also imagine that the higher need for social spending we
found in this paper could imply lower public spending in other sectors (e.g. public
investment) rather than higher taxes. If, for instance, the government reduces public
investment to finance social spending, the productivity of the private sector may go
down.9 This may outbalance most of the efficiency gains from privatization. After all,
this section suggests that for a thorough understanding of privatization, its potential
indirect distortions matter.
4.7 Conclusion
Most of the literature on privatization focuses on its micro-economic implications. On
the other hand, only few studies exist, which examine its link to macro-variables.
In particular it is still unclear, how privatization affects the composition of public
9There is a huge literature on the functioning of public investment as a public input. See e.g. Keen
and Marchand (1997) for more details.
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spending. It is the aim of this paper to contribute to a better understanding of this
link.
This paper investigates the impact of privatization on the composition of public ex-
penditure. If the likelihood of becoming unemployed is higher in the private sector,
privatization can be interpreted as transfer of risk from the public sector towards indi-
viduals. Consequently, individuals demand additional social protection (redistribution)
by the government to insure against this risk. Our model shows that this holds under
rather mild restrictions, namely that the number of workers in the economy is large
enough relative to the unemployed. Further, per capita unemployment benefits do
decrease if redistribution is financed by public profits, only: With privatization the
number of contributors (public workers) steadily decreases and at the same time the
number of transfer receivers (unemployed) increases. This conflict can only be resolved
through a reduction in per capita unemployment benefits. On the other hand, results
change if the government disposes over lump sum taxes for private and public workers
as additional tool to finance redistribution: Per capita transfers then increase with
privatization since the higher productivity of an increasing number of private workers
is taken into account to determine the optimal redistribution rate. Finally, we also
consider excess burden of taxation: If it is costly to raise money for public funds, pri-
vatization entails undesired distortions through a higher need of public social spending.
In this case, the government is no longer willing to implement optimal redistribution.
The results in this paper allow for several policy insights: Privatization may lead to
additional risks, in particular a higher probability of becoming unemployed. This in
turn is likely to affect the demand and therefore also level and composition of public
expenditure. E.g. while privatization implies less state control in one respect it leads to
higher state intervention in other fields undermining one of the most important aspects
of privatization efforts. Moreover, we have seen that privatization may lead to addi-
tional inefficiencies in the economy: E.g. if more public funds are required to finance
the additional social expenditure, the commonly known excess burden of taxation -
e.g. administrative costs - may arise and at least partly offset the productivity gains
generated by privatization. Thus, in order to properly evaluate a specific privatization
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reform, one needs to account for its potential indirect distortions in other respects.
Our analysis shows that future research in this direction is highly valuable, in par-
ticular, as regards the empirically verification of the link between privatization and
redistribution. Further, it might also be interesting to endogenize privatization in or-
der to better understand the tradeoff between the potential efficiency gains through
privatization and the potential distortions in other sectors. Finally, a thorough analysis
of the link between privatization and different types of public spending could be highly
valuable: For instance, higher public social spending may lead to a reduction in other
types of public expenditures such as public investment. If public investment serves
as public input factor for private firms, this adjustment in the composition of public
spending would partly offset the potential productivity gains from privatization.
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4.8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4.1:
Proof of i):
With the logarithmic utility function, the first order condition wrt. b writes
∂W
∂b
= (1− ρ) · 1
v
· ∂v
∂b
+ ρ · (1− p) · 1
b
= 0.
Using the budget constraint, this simplifies to
b = γpub · 1−ρ1−ρ·p

Proof of ii):
In order to determine the effect of privatization on redistribution transfers, derive b
wrt. ρ:
∂b
∂ρ
= γpub · −(1−ρ·p)−(1−ρ)·(−p)(1−ρ·p)2 = γpub · −1+ρ·p+p+ρ·(−p)(1−ρ·p)2 = γpub · −(1−p)(1−ρ·p)2 < 0
Overall redistribution is defined by b · ρ · (1− p) (per capita transfer times number of
unemployed). Using the explicit solution of b and deriving wrt. ρ yields
∂(b·ρ·(1−p))
∂ρ
= b · (1− p)+ ∂b
∂ρ
· ρ · (1− p) = γpub · 1−ρ1−ρ·p · (1− p)+ γpub · −(1−p)(1−ρ·p)2 · ρ · (1− p) =
γpub · 11−ρ·p · (1− p) ·
(
(1− ρ) + −(1−p)
(1−ρ·p) · ρ
)
In order to prove that overall redistribution unambiguously increases with privatization,
this expression needs to be larger than 0:
γpub · 11−ρ·p · (1− p) ·
(
(1− ρ) + −(1−p)
(1−ρ·p) · ρ
)
> 0
or
1− 2 · ρ+ ρ2 · p > 0.
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This yields
p > 2·ρ−1
ρ2
.
The graph of this function is displayed in Figure (4.3).

Proof of iii):
Show that v = b:
v = γpub − ρ1−ρ · (1− p) · b = b
or
γpub − ρ1−ρ · (1− p) · γpub · 1−ρ1−ρ·p = γpub · 1−ρ1−ρ·p .
This simplifies to
1− ρ = 1− ρ
qed.
Show that w > v:
w > v = γpub − ρ1−ρ · (1− p) · b
or
w > γpub − ρ1−ρ · (1− p) · γpub · 1−ρ1−ρ·p
This simplifies to
w > γpub ·
(
1− ρ·(1−p)
1−ρ·p
)
.
Since by definition w > γpub and 1 >
ρ·(1−p)
1−ρ·p > 0 this is always true.

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Proof of Proposition 4.2:
Proof of i):
With the logarithmic utility function, the first order condition wrt. τ reads
(1− ρ) · 1
γpub− 11−ρ ·((1−p)·ρ·b−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·τ)−τ
·
(
1
1−ρ · (1− ρ+ ρ · p)− 1
)
− ρ · p · 1
w−τ = 0.
This can be transformed into
τ =
(1−ρ)·(w−γpub)+ρ·(1−p)·b
1−ρ+ρ·p .
The first order condition wrt. b reads
(1− ρ) · 1
γpub− 11−ρ ·((1−p)·ρ·b−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·τ)−τ
· ρ
1−ρ · (1− p)− ρ · (1− p) · 1b = 0,
which yields
b =
γpub·(1−ρ)+ρ·p·τ
1−ρ·p .
Substituting b and τ respectively yields the result:
τ = w − ρ · p · w − (1− ρ) · γpub
and
b = ρ · p · w + (1− ρ) · γpub.

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Proof of ii):
Deriving the per capita redistribution transfer b wrt. ρ yields
∂b
∂ρ
= (p− 1) · γpub + p · (w − γpub) = p · w − γpub > 0 (by definition).
Deriving overall redistribution b · ρ · (1− p) wrt. ρ yields
∂(b·ρ·(1−p))
∂ρ
= b · (1− p) + ∂b
∂ρ
· ρ · (1− p) =
= (1− p) · ((1− ρ+ ρ · p) · γpub + ρ · p · (w − γpub) + (p · w − γpub) · ρ) > 0.

Proof of iii):
Rewriting τ yields:
τ = w − ρ · p · w − (1− ρ) · γpub = w − b. Thus, w − τ = b.
Since the lump sum tax is equal for workers in the public and private sector, it still
needs to be shown that v = w: Plugging b and τ into the budget constraint of the
government yields
v = γpub − 11−ρ · ((1− p) · ρ · b− (1− ρ+ ρ · p) · τ)
With the explicit solutions for b and τ , this yields
v = γpub − ρ·p·w+(1−ρ)·γpub−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·w1−ρ
or
v = w

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Proof of Proposition 4.3:
Proof of i):
With the logarithmic utility function, the first order condition wrt. τ reads
∂W
∂τ
= (1− ρ) · 1
v−τ ·
(
∂v
∂τ
− 1)+ ρ · p · 1
w−τ · (−1) = 0
or
1
γpub− 11−ρ ·((1−p)·ρ·b−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·τ ·(1−λ))−τ
· ((1− ρ+ ρ · p) · (1− λ)− (1− ρ)) = p · ρ · 1
w−τ .
Solving for τ yields
τ =
w· ρ·p−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ
p·ρ −γpub+ 11−ρ ·(1−p)·ρ·b
(1−ρ+ρ·p)·( 1−λ1−ρ− λp·ρ)
.
The first order condition wrt. b reads
F = ∂W
∂b
= (1− ρ) · 1
v−τ · ∂v∂b + ρ · (1− p) · 1b = 0
or
(1− ρ) · 1
γpub− 11−ρ ·((1−p)·ρ·b−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·τ ·(1−λ))−τ
· ρ
1−ρ · (1− p) = ρ · (1− p) · 1b .
Solving for b yields
b =
γpub·(1−ρ)+(ρ·p−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ)·τ
1−ρ·p .
Substituting b and τ respectively yields the result:
τ =
w· ρ·p−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ
p·ρ −γpub+(1−p)·ρ·
γpub
1−ρ·p
(1−ρ+ρ·p)·( 1−λ1−ρ− λp·ρ)−( 11−ρ ·(1−p)·ρ·
(ρ·p−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ)
1−ρ·p )
and
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b =
( 1−λ1−ρ− λp·ρ)·γpub·(1−ρ)+( ρ·p1−ρ+ρ·p−λ)·(w·(1−
(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ
p·ρ )−γpub)
(1−ρ·p)·( 1−λ1−ρ− λp·ρ)−(
(1−p)·ρ
1−ρ ·( ρ·p1−ρ+ρ·p−λ))
It still needs to be shown that the derivative of the per capita transfer b wrt. λ is
smaller than zero, thus:
∂b
∂λ
=
((1−ρ·p)·( 1−λ1−ρ− λp·ρ)−(
(1−p)·ρ
1−ρ ·( ρ·p1−ρ+ρ·p−λ)))·
„
−γpub−
(1−ρ)·γpub
ρ·p −w·(1−
(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ
p·ρ )+γpub−(w·(1−
(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ
p·ρ ))
«
((1−ρ·p)·( 1−λ1−ρ− λp·ρ)−(
(1−p)·ρ
1−ρ ·( ρ·p1−ρ+ρ·p−λ)))
2 −
((1−ρ·p)(− 11−ρ− 1ρ·p )+
(1−p)·ρ
1−ρ )·(( 1−λ1−ρ− λp·ρ)·γpub·(1−ρ)+( ρ·p1−ρ+ρ·p−λ)·(w·(1−
(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ
p·ρ )−γpub))
((1−ρ·p)·( 1−λ1−ρ− λp·ρ)−(
(1−p)·ρ
1−ρ ·( ρ·p1−ρ+ρ·p−λ)))
2 < 0.
This can be transformed into
(
(1− ρ · p)(− 1
1−ρ − 1ρ·p) + (1−p)·ρ1−ρ
)
·
·
(
ρ·p−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ
(1−ρ)·ρ·p · γpub · (1− ρ) + (ρ·p−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ1−ρ+ρ·p ) ·
(
w ·
(
1− (1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ
p·ρ
)
− γpub
))
−
−
(
(1− ρ · p) · ρ·p−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ
(1−ρ)·ρ·p −
(
(1−p)·ρ
1−ρ · (ρ·p−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ1−ρ+ρ·p )
))
·
·
(
− (1−ρ)·γpub
ρ·p − 2 · w ·
(
1− (1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ
p·ρ
))
> 0,
which finally yields
0 < w · (p · ρ− (1− ρ+ ρ · p) · λ) for p · ρ− (1− ρ+ ρ · p) · λ > 0 and
0 > w · (p · ρ− (1− ρ+ ρ · p) · λ) for p · ρ− (1− ρ+ ρ · p) · λ < 0.
This is always true.
Further, it needs to be shown that the derivative of the lump-sum tax τ wrt. λ is larger
than zero:
∂τ
∂λ
=
(−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·( 11−ρ+ 1ρ·p)+(
(1−p)·ρ
1−ρ ·
(1−ρ+ρ·p
1−ρ·p ))·
„
w· ρ·p−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ
p·ρ −γpub+
(1−p)·ρ·γpub
1−ρ·p
«
((1−ρ+ρ·p)·( 1−λ1−ρ− λp·ρ)−(
(1−p)·ρ
1−ρ ·
(ρ·p−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ)
1−ρ·p ))
2 −
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−((1−ρ+ρ·p)·(
1−λ
1−ρ− λp·ρ)−(
(1−p)·ρ
1−ρ ·
(ρ·p−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ)
1−ρ·p ))·(−w·
(1−ρ+ρ·p)
ρ·p )
((1−ρ+ρ·p)·( 1−λ1−ρ− λp·ρ)−(
(1−p)·ρ
1−ρ ·
(ρ·p−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ)
1−ρ·p ))
2 > 0.
This can be simplified to
((1− ρ+ ρ · p) · (1− ρ · p)− ((1− p) · ρ) · ρ · p) · p·ρ−(1−ρ+ρ·p)λ
ρ·p·(1−ρ·p) · w >
> 1−ρ
(1−ρ·p) ·
(
w · ρ·p−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ
p·ρ − 1−ρ1−ρ·p · γpub
)
or
0 > − 1−ρ
1−ρ·p · γpub,
which yields the desired result.

Proof of ii):
To show that redistribution is no longer complete, we need to prove that w− τ > v− τ
and v < w:
1. w − τ > v − τ .
This rewrites
w > v = γpub − 11−ρ · ((1− p) · ρ · b− (1− ρ+ ρ · p) · τ · (1− λ))
or
w > γpub− 11−ρ · (1− p) ·ρ ·
( 1−λ1−ρ− λp·ρ)·γpub·(1−ρ)+( ρ·p1−ρ+ρ·p−λ)·(w·(1−
(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ
p·ρ )−γpub)
(1−ρ·p)·( 1−λ1−ρ− λp·ρ)−(
(1−p)·ρ
1−ρ ·( ρ·p1−ρ+ρ·p−λ))
+ (1−ρ+
ρ · p) · w·
ρ·p−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ
p·ρ −γpub+(1−p)·ρ·
γpub
1−ρ·p
(1−ρ+ρ·p)·( 1−λ1−ρ− λp·ρ)−( 11−ρ ·(1−p)·ρ·
(ρ·p−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ)
1−ρ·p )
· 1−λ
1−ρ ).
After some transformations this yields
(γpub − w) ·
(
(1− ρ · p) · ρ·p−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ
p·ρ −
(
(1− p) · ρ · ρ·p−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ
1−ρ+ρ·p
))
< (1 − p) · ρ ·(
ρ·p−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ
p·ρ · γpub + p·ρ−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ1−ρ+ρ·p ·
(
w ·
(
p·ρ−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ
p·ρ
)
− γpub
))
− (1− λ) · (1− ρ ·
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p) ·
(
w · ρ·p−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ
p·ρ − 1−ρ1−ρ·pγpub
)
or
γpub · (1− ρ) + w · ρ · p > w · (1− ρ+ ρ · p) · λ,
which yields the desired result.
2. v − τ = b:
γpub − 11−ρ · ((1− p) · ρ · b− (1− ρ+ ρ · p) · τ · (1− λ))− τ = b.
This rewrites
(1− ρ) · γpub − ((1− ρ+ ρ · p) · λ− ρ · p) · τ = (1− p · ρ) · b
or
(1−ρ) ·γpub− ((1− ρ+ ρ · p) · λ− ρ · p) · w·
ρ·p−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ
p·ρ −γpub+(1−p)·ρ·
γpub
1−ρ·p
(1−ρ+ρ·p)·( 1−λ1−ρ− λp·ρ)−( 11−ρ ·(1−p)·ρ·
(ρ·p−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ)
1−ρ·p )
=
(1− p · ρ) · (
1−λ
1−ρ− λp·ρ)·γpub·(1−ρ)+( ρ·p1−ρ+ρ·p−λ)·(w·(1−
(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ
p·ρ )−γpub)
(1−ρ·p)·( 1−λ1−ρ− λp·ρ)−(
(1−p)·ρ
1−ρ ·( ρ·p1−ρ+ρ·p−λ))
.
After some transformations this yields
(1−ρ)·γpub·
(
(1− ρ+ ρ · p) · ρ·p−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ
(1−ρ)·p·ρ −
(
(1−p)·ρ
1−ρ · ρ·p−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ1−ρ·p
))
−((1− ρ+ ρ · p) · λ− ρ · p)·(
w · ρ·p−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ
p·ρ −
(1−ρ)·γpub
1−ρ·p
)
=
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= (1− ρ+ ρ · p) ·
(
ρ·p−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ
p·ρ · γpub + ρ·p−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ1−ρ+ρ·p ·
(
w · ρ·p−(1−ρ+ρ·p)·λ
p·ρ − γpub
))
or
γpub · (1− ρ) ·
(
1−ρ·p−1+ρ·p
(1−ρ·p)·p·ρ
)
= 0.
This is identical to
0 = 0,
which is always true.

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